Guns, Drugs, and. . . Federalism? - \u3cem\u3eGonzales V. Raich\u3c/em\u3e Enfeebles the Rehnquist Court\u27s \u3cem\u3eLopez-Morrison\u3c/em\u3e Framework by Luck, David L.
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 61 
Number 1 Volume 61 Number 1 (October 2006) Article 7 
10-1-2006 
Guns, Drugs, and. . . Federalism? - Gonzales V. Raich Enfeebles 
the Rehnquist Court's Lopez-Morrison Framework 
David L. Luck 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David L. Luck, Guns, Drugs, and. . . Federalism? - Gonzales V. Raich Enfeebles the Rehnquist Court's 
Lopez-Morrison Framework, 61 U. Miami L. Rev. 237 (2006) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol61/iss1/7 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 
Guns, Drugs, and ... Federalism? - Gonzales
v. Raich Enfeebles the Rehnquist Court's
Lopez-Morrison Framework
DAVID L. LUCK*
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................... 238
A. A Brief History of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence ................... 238
B. Organization & Objectives ........................................ 243
1. DOES RAICH MAKE SENSE
9. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  243
II. RAICH'S LEGAL ISSUES ............................................... 244
A. The Controlled Substances Act & Medical Marijuana .................. 244
B. California's Compassionate Use Act ................................ 248
C . Preemption ..................................................... 250
D. The Supreme Court's Third Era Commerce Clause Jurisprudence & Lopez
and Morrison's Collective Impact ................................... 251
1. MAPPING THE COURT'S THIRD ERA JURISPRUDENCE .................. .... 251
2. LOPEZ, MORRISON, & THE RISE OF THE FOURTH ERA .................... 258
III. GONZALES V. RAICH.. ................................................. 260
A. Facts & Procedure .............................................. 260
B. Justice Stevens' Majority Opinion - The Lopez-Morrison Framework
Unjustifiably Abandoned ...... ................................... 264
C. Justice Scalia's Concurrence - Drugs Trump State Sovereignty ......... 270
D. Justice O'Connor's Dissent - Wholly Intrastate Medical Marijuana
Legalization Implicates State Sovereignty & Demands a Lopez-Morrison
Analysis ....................................................... 273
E. Justice Thomas' Dissent - The States are Co-equal Sovereigns, Right? ... 277
F. Raich's Consequences for Commerce Clause Jurisprudence ............ 279
IV. CRITIQUE ............................................................. 280
A. Justice Stevens' Disconnect from the Lopez-Morrison Framework - Should
W ickard & W irtz Apply in Raich? .................................. 280
B. Post-Raich, What Recourse Do the States Have? ...................... 284
C. Following Raich, What Direction Should the Court Take to Preserve State
Sovereignty? .................................................... 286
V . C ONCLUSION ........................................................ 288
* David L. Luck is a Juris Doctor candidate at the University of Miami School of Law who
will graduate in May 2007. The author extends his thanks to everyone who assisted him in
creating this Note. Primary thanks, however, belong to Professor Mario L. Barnes, an Associate
Professor of Law at the University of Miami. Without Professor Barnes' collaboration, critique,
and support, this Note would not have been possible.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
The political process has not protected against these encroachments
on state activities, even though they directly impinge on a State's
ability to make and enforce its laws. With the abandonment of
National League of Cities, all that stands between the remaining
essentials of state sovereignty and Congress is the latter's underde-
veloped capacity for self-restraint. *
I. INTRODUCTION
A. A Brief History of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
In the late 1990s the United States Supreme Court handed down
two significant decisions intended to restore the balance between con-
gressional Commerce Clause legislation and state police power regula-
tions - United States v. Lopez' and United States v. Morrison.2 In
Morrison, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the Lopez-Morrison
framework provided the required analytical structure to address "sub-
stantial effects" Commerce Clause challenges.3 In spite of this prece-
dent, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in Gonzales v. Raich - a
"substantial effects" case - declined to apply the Lopez-Morrison frame-
work.4 Instead, Justice Stevens distinguished those cases on their facts.5
Raich, as part of a seemingly endless historic cycle, has again raised the
question, "what does 'federalism' mean?" Some may dismiss that ques-
tion as purely academic, but the answer is of considerable importance to
advocates of a less centralized government.
Within the Commerce Clause context, many constitutional scholars
divide Supreme Court decisions into distinct chronological-thematic
eras. A general consensus recognizes three such eras, while some schol-
ars recognize a fourth: (1) Broad Commerce Power, but Largely Unde-
fined - Inception-1888; (2) Narrowly Defined to Promote Laissez-Faire
Capitalism - 1888-1936; (3) Broadly Defined to Further the New Deal -
1937-1995; and (4) Broadly Defined, but Somewhat Circumscribed to
Foster Dual Federalism - 1995-present.6 During the Third Era the
* Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 587-88 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
1. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
2. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
3. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609 ("Since Lopez most recently canvassed and clarified our case
law governing this third category of Commerce Clause regulation [i.e. activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce], it provides the proper framework for conducting the required analysis
.. .. .).
4. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2207-11 (2005).
5. Id.
6. See, e.g., JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONsTrruTIONA LAW 163-225 (7th
ed. 2004) (describing the three commerce eras and concluding that post-1995 the Rehnquist Court
adopted a posture favoring both expanded state police power and a more narrowly tailored federal
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Supreme Court largely declined to overturn congressional Commerce
Clause legislation, even within the context of as-applied challenges.7 In
the latter portion of this era, some Justices wondered whether any aspect
of American life was beyond the commerce power's grasp.8 This near
limitless Commerce Clause doctrine starkly contrasted with Alexander
Hamilton and James Madison's prior assurances that, in ratifying the
Constitution, the states were to retain a sphere of sovereignty. 9
Those assurances, which appeared in the Federalist papers, were
primarily intended to assuage the Anti-Federalists' concerns that the
Constitution represented the destruction of individual liberty and state
sovereignty.' ° Madison and Hamilton undoubtedly contemplated a
greater role for the states than that posited by Professor Wechsler in his
famous thesis, wherein he argued that the judiciary should not intervene
to define federalism's contours because the states' traditional functions
are protected structurally by their participation in the national govern-
commerce power); ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 195-200 (Sanford
Levinson ed., 4th ed. 2005) (recognizing the "potential for a sea change" posed by two Rehnquist
Commerce Clause opinions - United States v. Lopez and Unites States v. Morrison - which could
represent "the ultimate lesson that the willingness of President Franklin Roosevelt's justices to
give Congress enhanced power was later matched by an equal determination of appointees of far
more conservative Presidents to reign in the national government").
7. With the notable exception of National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
8. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564-65 ("Although Justice Breyer argues that acceptance of
the Government's rationales would not authorize a general federal police power, he is unable to
identify any activity that the States may regulate but Congress may not. Justice Breyer posits that
there might be some limitations on Congress' commerce power, such as family law or certain
aspects of education. These suggested limitations, when viewed in light of the dissent's expansive
analysis, are devoid of substance.... For instance, if Congress can, pursuant to its Commerce
Clause power, regulate activities that adversely affect the learning environment, then, afortiori, it
also can regulate the educational process directly. Congress could determine that a school's
curriculum has a 'significant' effect on the extent of classroom learning. As a result, Congress
could mandate a federal curriculum for local elementary and secondary schools because what is
taught in local schools has a significant 'effect on classroom learning,' and that, in turn, has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce." (internal citations omitted)).
9. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[T]he
proposed government cannot be deemed a national one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain
enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty
over all other objects."); THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) ("The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few
and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite....
The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary
course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order,
improvement, and prosperity of the State."); THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 198 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[A]s the plan of the convention aims only at a partial
union or consolidation, the State governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty
which they before had, and which were not, by that act, exclusively delegated to the United
States.").
10. See generally Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118
HARV. L. REv. 915 (2005).
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ment. I I In keeping with Wechsler's thesis, however, the Third Era
Court did not recognize a sphere of state sovereignty that lay outside the
bounds of the federal commerce power. Justice Stone made this abun-
dantly clear in United States v. Darby when he stated,
[o]ur conclusion is unaffected by the Tenth Amendment which pro-
vides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Consti-
tution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." The amendment states but a truism
that all is retained which has not been surrendered.' 2
The Burger Court attempted to reinstitute a balance between federal
and state power in 1976 with National League of Cities v. Usery.'3 The
case involved the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act,
which applied the Act's minimum wage and maximum hour provisions
to public agencies, including the states. 4 The opinion, authored by then
Associate Justice William Rehnquist, reestablished the Tenth Amend-
ment as an affirmative limit on Congress's commerce power.' 5 Justice
Rehnquist conceived a system where the Tenth Amendment circum-
scribed congressional authority to regulate the "States Qua States."'
' 6
The practical effect of this limitation was to insulate state police power
regulations from Commerce Clause interference.' 7 Justice Rehnquist
11. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 546 (1954)
(arguing that the Senate's representation structure - two senators per state, regardless of size -
enables significant state participation in the national government, with the states "regarded as
constituent and essential parts of the federal government" (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at
291 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961))).
12. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1941) (emphasis supplied).
13. 426 U.S. 833, 842-43 (1976).
14. Id. at 836-37.
15. Id. at 842-43 ("While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a truism, stating
merely that all is retained which has not been surrendered, it is not without significance. The
Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in
a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal
system." (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
16. Id. at 854-55 (stating "we have reaffirmed today that the States as States stand on a quite
different footing from an individual or a corporation when challenging the exercise of Congress'
power to regulate commerce. We think the dicta from United States v. California, simply wrong.
Congress may not exercise that power so as to force directly upon the States its choices as to how
essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral governmental functions are to be made. We
agree that such assertions of power, if unchecked, would indeed, as Mr. Justice Douglas cautioned
in his dissent in Wirtz, allow 'the National Government [to] devour the essentials of state
sovereignty,' and would therefore transgress the bounds of the authority granted Congress under
the Commerce Clause. While there are obvious differences between the schools and hospitals
involved in Wirtz, and the fire and police departments affected here, each provides an integral
portion of those governmental services which the States and their political subdivisions have
traditionally afforded their citizens. We are therefore persuaded that Wirtz must be overruled."
(internal citations omitted)).
17. Id. at 851-52 ("[F]ire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks
[Vol. 61:237
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established a dichotomy between traditional government functions and
non-traditional government functions, demarcating the permissible
extent of congressional Commerce Clause regulation regarding the
states. 8 When Congress attempted to regulate traditional state govern-
ment functions, the Tenth Amendment acted as a bar, thereby safeguard-
ing state sovereignty. 9  National League of Cities' traditional
government functions versus non-traditional government functions
dichotomy, however, did not endure.
In 1985, the Burger Court overruled National League of Cities in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.2" Garcia
involved yet another application of the Fair Labor Standards Act. A
municipal mass transit authority asserted that the Act, as-applied, repre-
sented an interference with a traditional government function - munici-
pal public transit.2" Justice Blackmun abandoned Justice Rehnquist's
dichotomy as unworkable.22 Blackmun cited Professor Wechsler, with
approval, for the proposition that the states' protection in our federal
system is ensured primarily by their participation in the national govern-
ment, rather than by any affirmative limits imposed by the Tenth
Amendment.23 The Court - despite vehement dissents by Justices Pow-
ell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor - rejected the proposition that the Tenth
Amendment placed substantive limits on Congress's ability to apply the
and recreation. These activities are typical of those performed by state and local governments in
discharging their dual functions of administering the public law and furnishing public services.
Indeed, it is functions such as these which governments are created to provide, services such as
these which the States have traditionally afforded their citizens.... We hold that insofar as the
challenged amendments operate to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral
operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, they are not within the authority granted
Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.").
18. Id.
19. Id. at 842-43 ("While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a 'truism,' stating
merely that 'all is retained which has not been surrendered,' it is not without significance. The
Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in
a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal
system." (internal citations omitted)).
20. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
21. Id. at 530-31.
22. Id. at 531 ("[T]he attempt to draw the boundaries of state regulatory immunity in terms of
'traditional governmental function' is not only unworkable but is also inconsistent with
established principles of federalism and, indeed, with those very federalism principles on which
National League of Cities purported to rest. That case, accordingly, is overruled.").
23. Id. at 550-51 (citing Professor Wechsler in support of the proposition that "[a]part from
the limitation on federal authority inherent in the delegated nature of Congress' Article I powers,
the principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal system
lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself. It is no novelty to observe that the
composition of the Federal Government was designed in large part to protect the States from
overreaching by Congress.").
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commerce power to the states.24 Epitomizing the Garcia dissenters'
concerns, Justice O'Connor stated:
[F]ederalism cannot be reduced to the weak essence distilled by the
majority today. There is more to federalism than the nature of the
constraints that can be imposed on the States in the realm of authority
left open to them by the Constitution.
Justice Rehnquist posited the Garcia dissenters' other primary conten-
tion by stating in a thinly veiled jab at the majority that it was only a
matter of time before the Court revived the National League of Cities
dichotomy.26
National League of Cities' revival of the Tenth Amendment as an
affirmative limit on the commerce power, while brief, foreshadowed the
eventual doctrinal developments in Lopez27 and Morrison.2 8 In those
cases, the Rehnquist Court labored to articulate limits on Congress's
commerce power that would ensure a "distinction between what is
national and what is local," and avoid the creation of "a completely cen-
tralized government."2 9 To accomplish that goal, the Court imposed a
new doctrinal framework within a single Commerce Clause sub-context.
Justice Rehnquist recognized that Congress may regulate interstate com-
merce within three areas: (1) the channels of interstate commerce; (2)
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce; and (3) activities that sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce.30 Justice Rehnquist, however, cre-
ated the new framework solely to address the third sphere of
congressional commerce regulation - activities that substantially affect
24. Id. at 554 ("[Wle are convinced that the fundamental limitation that the constitutional
scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause to protect the 'States as States' is one of process rather
than one of result. Any substantive restraint on the exercise of Commerce Clause powers must
find its justification in the procedural nature of this basic limitation, and it must be tailored to
compensate for possible failings in the national political process rather than to dictate a 'sacred
province of state autonomy."' (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 236 (1983))).
25. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 580 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
26. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("I do not think it incumbent on those of us in dissent to
spell out further the fine points of a principle that will, I am confident, in time again command the
support of a majority of this Court.").
27. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
28. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
29. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557; see Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608 ("Even [our] modem-era
precedents which have expanded congressional power under the Commerce Clause confirm that
this power is subject to outer limits. In Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court warned that the scope of
the interstate commerce power 'must be considered in the light of our dual system of government
and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and
remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the
distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized
government.' (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556-57)).
30. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-13.
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interstate commerce.31 On one hand, the Third Era Court gave Congress
the power to characterize nearly any regulatory matter as "substantially
affecting" interstate commerce.32 On the other hand, the Rehnquist
Court hoped the Lopez-Morrison framework, via a five-part analysis,33
would restrict that virtually limitless power: (1) does the case involve
"substantial effects" legislation; (2) if so, is the regulatory subject matter
commercial or noncommercial; (3) is there a jurisdictional element
ensuring a connection to interstate commerce; (4) are there congres-
sional findings demonstrating a connection to interstate commerce; and
(5) is the purported effect on interstate commerce attenuated - is it pred-
icated upon an inference upon an inference?
34
National League of Cities, Lopez, and Morrison share the same
intrinsic goal: to preserve a sphere of local activity as a domain for state
action. That common thread led to a conflict in one of the Rehnquist
Court's final Commerce Clause cases, Gonzales v. Raich. Raich
exposed the Lopez-Morrison framework's weaknesses and signaled the
need for a more viable means to preserve even a modicum of local state
sovereignty in the face of a broad commerce power.
3 6
B. Organization & Objectives
This Note will explore Gonzales v. Raich's majority, concurring,
and dissenting opinions, with an eye towards the inherent futility created
by the majority's conception of the Lopez-Morrison framework. This
narrow conception permits Congress to unilaterally sculpt the bounds of
state sovereignty and once again questions the Tenth Amendment's sig-
nificance. The framework that emerges is devoid of the protections nec-
essary to ensure its primary goal - retaining a sphere of local state
sovereignty to prevent "a completely centralized government.
37
1. DOES RAICH MAKE SENSE?
In the remaining sections, I present the difficulties that arise when
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that a single farmer's wheat,
grown for personal consumption, substantially affected interstate commerce).
33. Courts applying the Lopez-Morrison Framework have explicitly identified four prongs -
prongs (2)-(5) above. However, the threshold question these courts have inevitably asked before
applying the framework is something along the lines of "is this a 'substantial effects' case?"
Consequently, this Note addresses the Lopez-Morrison Framework as a five part analysis
beginning with that threshold inquiry.
34. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-13.
35. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
36. This, of course, assumes that the Roberts Court will continue the Rehnquist Court's
tradition of extolling the virtues of state sovereignty and dual federalism.
37. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995).
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one endeavors to harmonize Raich with the Lopez-Morrison framework.
This exercise's ultimate objective is to suggest how the Court might
craft a more effective standard to resolve disputes between federal and
state regulation. Section II addresses the legal issues implicated by the
Court's Commerce Clause analysis - with the definitive issue being
whether the states may create a medical exception to the federal Con-
trolled Substances Act, which would decriminalize the production and
consumption of medical marijuana by state citizens who possess a valid
recommendation from a state-licensed physician.38 To provide an
appropriate context for that issue, Subsection A includes a brief history
of American marijuana regulation, along with a description of the fed-
eral Controlled Substances Act ("CSA"). Subsection B describes Cali-
fornia's Compassionate Use Act ("CUA") and its underlying impetus.
Subsection C addresses the federal preemption issue created by the sup-
posed CSA-CUA collision. Finally, Subsection D considers the Court's
Third Era Commerce Clause jurisprudence, and the Rehnquist Court's
subsequent attempt to limit its breadth.
Section III deconstructs Raich itself, including: Justice Stevens'
majority opinion, Justice Scalia's concurrence, Justice O'Connor's dis-
sent, and Justice Thomas' dissent. They are respectively addressed in
subsections B, C, D, and E. Section IV, Subsection A, scrutinizes the
disconnect between Justice Stevens' majority opinion and Chief Justice
Rehnquist's Lopez-Morrison framework, while addressing the question
of whether Lopez and Morrison are reconcilable with two influential
Third Era decisions - Wickard v. Filburn3 9 and Maryland v. Wirtz.n°
Subsection B discusses whether the states have any legal alternative to
provide their seriously ill citizens with medical marijuana free of federal
control.
Finally, subsection C contemplates a return to the National League
of Cities dichotomy, thereby preventing congressional interference - via
the Commerce Clause - with the states' traditional police powers. Sec-
tion V acknowledges the Roberts Court's currently undefined federalism
stance, but notes that if history is any guide, the Tenth Amendment will
return as a limit on Congress's commerce power.
II. RAICH's LEGAL ISSUES
A. The Controlled Substances Act & Medical Marijuana
Despite the modem stigma attached to marijuana use, marijuana
38. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2198.
39. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
40. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
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has had a relatively brief history of outright criminalization in the United
States.4 In fact, beginning in the 19th century Americans began using
marijuana for medicinal purposes to treat such maladies as asthma,
chronic bronchitis, convulsions, dysmenorrheal, gonorrhea, post partum
psychosis, headaches, insomnia, lack of appetite, and rheumatic pain.
42
Furthermore, marijuana remained in the United States pharmacopoeia
until 1941." During the late 1930s, increased social awareness of mari-
juana abuse encouraged many states to pass laws restricting its use and
possession."
The Federal government joined the marijuana regulation menagerie
with the Pure Foods and Drugs Act of 1906, therein specifying labeling
and packaging requirements for over-the-counter cannabis medica-
tions.45 However, the first major federal marijuana legislation was the
1937 Marijuana Tax Act ("1937 Act"), which outlawed marijuana's use,
save for medical purposes. In regulating marijuana's medical usage, the
1937 Act erected a prohibitively expensive tax and penalty system,
which discouraged doctors from writing marijuana prescriptions.4 6
In 1969, President Nixon declared the "War on Drugs. 47 At its
heart was the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act
41. Deborah Garner, Up In Smoke: The Medicinal Marijuana Debate, 75 N. DAK. L. REV.
555, 556-58 (1999) (describing how marijuana was a legal, pharmacologically recognized drug in
the United States until 1941).
42. Id. at n.26 (citing Gregg A. Bilz, Note, The Medical Use of Marijuana: The Politics of
Medicine, 13 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 117, 118 (1992); LESTER GRINSPOON & JAMES B.
BAKALAR, MARIHUANA: THE FORBIDDEN MEDICINE 5 (1993)).
43. K.K. DuVivier, State Ballot Initiatives in the Federal Preemption Equation: A Medical
Marijuana Case Study, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 221, 277-78 (2005) ("Marijuana had been listed
in the United States Pharmacopoeia since 1850, and American doctors continued to prescribe it
until 1937 when the paperwork and expense of complying with the Marijuana Tax Act made it
prohibitive. By 1941, the National Formulary and Pharmacopoeia dropped marijuana from their
listings.").
44. Garner, supra note 41, at 558 ("On January 1, 1932, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics
warned that marijuana had come into widespread and increasing abuse and encouraged the
passage of rigid marijuana laws. By 1937, nearly every state had laws restricting marijuana.
Under most of these laws, use of marijuana was subjected to the same penalties applicable to
morphine, heroin, and cocaine, even though designating marijuana as a narcotic was technically
incorrect.").
45. Lauryn P. Gouldin, Controlled Substance Law, Cannabis, Compassionate Use and the
Commerce Clause: Why Developments in California May Limit the Constitutional Reach of the
Federal Drug Laws, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 471, 475 (1999) ("The first federal regulation of
marijuana appeared in the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, which required, on all foods and
over-the-counter medicines containing cannabis, clear labels specifying the quantity of cannabis
contained.").
46. Id. at 476.
47. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2201; D. MusTo & P. KORSMEYER, THE QUEST FOR
DRUG CONTROL 60 (2002).
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of 1970,48 better known as the Controlled Substances Act ("CSA").4 9
The CSA's goals are: (1) preventing drug abuse and rehabilitating
addicts; (2) providing more effective means of law enforcement; and (3)
providing a balanced scheme of ciiminal penalties for drug offenses. 50
The Act groups controlled substances into five Schedules, with Schedule
I being the most restrictive and Schedule V being the least restrictive.
The federal government schedules a drug based on three main factors:
(1) potential for abuse; (2) currently accepted medical uses; and (3) level
of psychological and physical dependence. 5' Marijuana is classified as a
Schedule I substance; accordingly it is deemed to have "a high potential
for abuse," "no currently accepted medical use," and "a lack of accepted
safety for use under medical supervision. 52 Due to this classifica-
tion, marijuana use - even for medicinal purposes - is illegal under fed-
eral law, with the possible exception of participation in an exceedingly
small federal research program.53
The Department of Justice ("DOJ") claims that the CSA represents
a "closed regulatory system."' 54 The Act criminalizes the manufacture,
distribution, dispensation, or possession of any controlled substance
except as authorized under its terms.55 Those terms only permit pre-
scriptions for drugs listed in Schedules II - V, hence marijuana and
other Schedule I drugs may not be prescribed per federal law. 56 Under
the CSA's framework, the Attorney General may reclassify or remove
controlled substances, but he or she must consult with the Secretary of
Health and Human Services ("HHS Secretary") in making such determi-
nations. 57 The HHS Secretary's recommendations are binding concern-
ing "scientific and medical matters."58
The relevant factors bearing on any removal or reclassification are
the drug's: (1) actual or relative potential for abuse; (2) scientific evi-
dence of its pharmacological effect; (3) the scientific knowledge regard-
48. Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Prevention Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat.
1236 (1970).
49. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (2005).
50. H.R. REP. No. 91-1444 513 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4417, at 4567.
51. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2005).
52. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (2005).
53. See 21 U.S.C. § 823(f) (2005).
54. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2, Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) (No. 03-
1454), available at 2004 WL 871328 ("The CSA thus establishes a closed system of drug
distribution for all controlled substances. To effectuate that closed system, the CSA authorizes
transactions within the legitimate distribution chain and makes all others illegal.") (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
55. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2005).
56. See 21 U.S.C. § 829 (2005).
57. 21 U.S.C. § 811 (2005).
58. Id.
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ing the drug; (4) its history and current pattern of abuse; (5) the scope,
duration, and significance of abuse; (6) the risk to the public health; (7)
its psychological and physical dependency; and (8) whether the drug is a
precursor of a drug already controlled under the CSA. 59  To date, all
marijuana rescheduling efforts have failed,6" in spite of studies sug-
gesting it possesses legitimate medical uses.6 '
To complicate matters, the CSA is ambivalent concerning congres-
sional intent to preempt the field of controlled substance regulation.62 In
response to this ambivalence and the federal government's steadfast
refusal to reclassify marijuana, during the late 1990s many states passed
59. Id.
60. Gouldin, supra note 45, at 478-79 (citing Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA, 930
F.2d 936, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1991)) ("Driven specifically by the Controlled Substance Act's
prohibition of the medical use of marijuana, through its inclusion of marijuana in Schedule I, the
National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws ("NORML") endeavored to get
marijuana rescheduled. The Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") eventually agreed to
commence public hearings in 1986 on the possible rescheduling of marijuana. After two years of
hearings, an administrative law judge ruled that 'a respectable minority' of American physicians'
accepted medical uses of marijuana for the treatment of cancer, glaucoma, and other diseases.
Because of marijuana's 'currently accepted medical use,' the judge recommended the removal of
marijuana from Schedule I and placement in Schedule II. Instead of adopting the judge's ruling,
the Administrator of the DEA applied an eight-factor test to reject NORML's petition
rescheduling marijuana.").
61. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, Marijuana and Medicine: Assessing the Science Base 177
(Janet E. Joy et. al. eds., 1999), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309071550/html/;
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 1997, Cannabis: A Health Perspective and Research Agenda.
Geneva: WHO, available at http://www.nap.edu/html/marimed/app-E.html ("Therapeutic uses of
cannabinoids warrant further basic pharmacological and experimental investigation and clinical
research into their effectiveness. More research is needed on the basic neuropharmacology of
THC and other cannabinoids so that better therapeutic agents can be found.").
62. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 801(3)-(6) (2005) ("A major portion of the traffic in controlled
substances flows through interstate and foreign commerce. Incidents of the traffic which are not
an integral part of the interstate or foreign flow, such as manufacture, local distribution, and
possession, nonetheless have a substantial and direct effect upon interstate commerce because -
(A) after manufacture, many controlled substances are transported in interstate commerce, (B)
controlled substances distributed locally usually have been transported in interstate commerce
immediately before their distribution, and (C) controlled substances possessed commonly flow
through interstate commerce immediately prior to such possession. (4) Local distribution and
possession of controlled substances contribute to swelling the interstate traffic in such substances.
(5) Controlled substances manufactured and distributed intrastate cannot be differentiated from
controlled substances manufactured and distributed interstate. Thus, it is not feasible to
distinguish, in terms of controls, between controlled substances manufactured and distributed
interstate and controlled substances manufactured and distributed intrastate. (6) Federal control of
the intrastate incidents of the traffic in controlled substances is essential to the effective control of
the interstate incidents of such traffic."), with 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2005) ("No provision of this title
subchapter shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the
field in which that provision operates, including criminal penalties, to the exclusion of any State
law on the same subject matter which would otherwise be within the authority of the State, unless
there is a positive conflict between that provision of this title subchapter and that State law so that
the two cannot consistently stand together.").
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legislation legalizing medical marijuana.6 3 California was one such
state.
B. California's Compassionate Use Act
In 1996, California voters passed Proposition 215, which resulted
in the California CUA. 4 The CUA's stated purposes are:
(A) To ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain
and use marijuana for medical purposes where that medical use is
deemed appropriate and has been recommended by a physician who
has determined that the person's health would benefit from the use of
marijuana in the treatment of cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain,
spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or any other illness for
which marijuana provides relief. (B) To ensure that patients and their
primary caregivers who obtain and use marijuana for medical pur-
poses upon the recommendation of a physician are not subject to
criminal prosecution or sanction. (C) To encourage the federal and
state governments to implement a plan to provide for the safe and
affordable distribution of marijuana to all patients in medical need of
marijuana.65
Of particular interest are the protections the CUA left in place con-
ceming the criminalization of marijuana manufacture, use, and posses-
sion for non-medical purposes. The CUA, for example, upholds all
California marijuana criminalization as applied to anyone other than a
patient or primary caregiver who possesses a valid doctor recommenda-
tion.6 6 The CUA's protection range is actually quite narrow. California
physicians who recommend medical marijuana are protected from prose-
cution.6 7 In addition, the patient and their primary caregiver 68 are
immune from state prosecution for marijuana possession and cultivation
63. See Compassionate Use Act of 1996, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West
Supp. 2004); ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.71.090, 17.37.010 et seq. (Michie 2003); CoLo. CONST. ART.
18, § 4; HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 329-121 to 128 et seq. (Michie Supp. 2003); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 2383-B(5)(a) (West 2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453A.200 (Michie Supp.
2003); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 475.300-346 (West 2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 §§ 4272-4474(d) et
seq. (2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 69.51.010-.080 (West 2004).
64. Gouldin, supra note 45, at 481.
65. Compassionate Use Act of 1996, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West Supp.
2004).
66. Id. ("Nothing in this section shall be construed to supersede legislation prohibiting
persons from engaging in conduct that endangers others, nor to condone the diversion of
marijuana for nonmedical purposes.").
67. Id. ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no physician in this state shall be
punished, or denied any right or privilege, for having recommended marijuana to a patient for
medical purposes.").
68. Id. ("Primary caregiver," is defined as, "the individual designated by the person exempted
under this section who has consistently assumed responsibility for the housing, health, or safety of
that person.").
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that is intended for the patient's medical use, as recommended by a
licensed physician.69
The CUA's statutory scheme is sparse, albeit possibly intentionally
so. 70 Consequently, there were wide implementation variances through-
out California, with different localities promulgating disparate regula-
tions."' These localities were principally left to their own devices in
implementing the CUA, with a prime example being the amount of
marijuana the individual patient or caregiver was allowed to possess and
cultivate.7 2  These problems, however, were the predictable result of
California experimenting with the implementation of a novel legislative
program.73
At first blush, the conflict between the CSA and CUA seems read-
ily apparent: how can one square a federal act that declares marijuana
"has no accepted medical use"' 7 4 with a state act whose express purpose
is "[t]o ensure that seriously ill [state citizens] have the right to obtain
and use marijuana for medical purposes where that medical use is
deemed appropriate and has been recommended by a physician?"
7
Quite simply, there is a disconnect between the federal and state govern-
ments in approaching the medical marijuana issue. The federal govern-
ment, in classifying marijuana as a Schedule I drug, sees the issue as a
national crime control problem, whereas states, like California, view
69. Id. ("Section 11357, relating to the possession of marijuana, and Section 11358, relating
to the cultivation of marijuana, shall not apply to a patient, or to a patient's primary caregiver,
who possesses or cultivates marijuana for the personal medical purposes of the patient upon the
written or oral recommendation or approval of a physician.").
70. Gouldin, supra note 45, at 493 ("It is not clear that this local experimentation was
unforeseen; the drafters of Proposition 215 seemed to anticipate that the Act was a work in
progress and explicitly stated that one of the Act's purposes is to 'encourage the federal and state
governments to implement a plan to provide for the safe and affordable distribution of marijuana
to all patients in medical need of marijuana."').
71. There were different law enforcement approaches to distinguishing medical marijuana
patients from non-patients. Northern California localities promulgated identification regulations
and issued ID cards, to ensure that medical marijuana patients were not inadvertently arrested and
prosecuted. In contrast, Southern California localities typically arrested patients, regardless of ID,
and forced the patient to bear the burden, during prosecution, of establishing that they were a
medical marijuana patient. Id. at 492.
72. Id. at 493 ( "The Oakland City Council established a policy which allows medicinal
marijuana users to stock a three-month supply of the drug; the policy is much more liberal than the
one set by the state Attorney General which allows about one marijuana cigarette per day. While
the state would limit home growers to the cultivation of two plants, the Oakland ordinance allows
qualifying users to grow up to 144 plants and to keep over a pound of processed marijuana.").
73. Id. ("[Tihe drafters of Proposition 215 seemed to anticipate that the Act was a work in
progress and explicitly stated that one of the Act's purposes is to 'encourage the federal and state
governments to implement a plan to provide for the safe and affordable distribution of marijuana
to all patients in medical need of marijuana.').
74. 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(B) (2005).
75. Compassionate Use Act of 1996, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West Supp.
2004).
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medical marijuana legalization as a state police power solution for seri-
ously ill state residents.
C. Preemption
The disconnect between federal and state marijuana regulation, in
turn, implicates the preemption doctrine.76 The Supreme Court has held
that "[t]he question whether a certain state action is pre-empted by fed-
eral law is one of congressional intent. 'The purpose of Congress is the
ultimate touchstone.' ,,77 In addition, there is a presumption against fed-
eral preemption of state police power regulations. 78  The CSA was
ambivalent regarding field preemption; moreover, there was no clear
statement of expressed preemption. In 21 U.S.C. § 801(5)-(6), Congress
stated that:
Controlled substances manufactured and distributed intrastate cannot
be differentiated from controlled substances manufactured and dis-
tributed interstate. Thus, it is not feasible to distinguish, in terms of
controls, between controlled substances manufactured and distributed
interstate and controlled substances manufactured and distributed
intrastate. Federal control of the intrastate incidents of the traffic in
controlled substances is essential to the effective control of the inter-
state incidents of such traffic.79
These CSA provisions give the impression that Congress intended to co-
opt and control local controlled substances regulation, in addition to reg-
ulating the interstate traffic in such substances. But 21 U.S.C. § 903
appears to leave the states some flexibility:
No provision of this title shall be construed as indicating an intent on
the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which that provision
operates, including criminal penalties, to the exclusion of any State
law on the same subject matter which would otherwise be within the
76. "It is a familiar and well-established principle that the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const.,
Art. VI, cl. 2, invalidates state laws that interfere with, or are contrary to, federal law. Under the
Supremacy Clause, federal law may supersede state law in several different ways. First, when
acting within constitutional limits, Congress is empowered to pre-empt state law by so stating in
express terms. In the absence of express pre-emptive language, Congress' intent to pre-empt all
state law in a particular area may be inferred where the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently
comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for supplementary
state regulation." Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712-13
(1985) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
77. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 96 (1992) (quoting Allis-Chalmers
Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985)).
78. Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 260 (2004) ("First,
'[in all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those [where] Congress has legislated ... in a field
which the States have traditionally occupied, we start with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress."' (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996))).
79. 21 U.S.C. § 801(5)-(6) (2005) (internal divisions omitted).
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authority of the State, unless there is a positive conflict between that
provision of this title and that State law so that the two cannot con-
sistently stand together.8"
The phrase "including criminal penalties" logically implies that
criminal penalties are included in addition to, not to the exclusion of,
other permissible state controlled substance regulation. Apparently,
these other permissible regulatory areas were not federally co-opted.
But, what are these other areas - provision of medical services to state
citizens, perhaps? It is doubtful Congress would have incorporated the
term "including," if "criminal penalties" was intended to be an exhaus-
tive delineation of the regulatory subject matter left to the states.8 In
sum, it is unclear whether Congress intended to preempt all state forays
into controlled substance regulation; likewise, it is apparent that the
CSA does not erect the DOJ's wholly "closed regulatory system."82
Such a contention does not comport with the CSA's patent statutory
language.83 In fact, 21 U.S.C. § 903 is a direct preemption disclaimer,
to the extent that the state and federal laws are not irreconcilable.8 4 The
resolution of the preemption issue seems imprecise at best, and the scope
of Congress's commerce power, post-Raich, is similarly ill defined.
D. The Supreme Court's Third Era Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
& Lopez and Morrison's Collective Impact
1. MAPPING THE COURT'S THIRD ERA JURISPRUDENCE
1937 marked the Third Era's inception. Justice Roberts' famous
80. 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2005).
81. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules
or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 404-06 (1950) ("Every
word and clause must be given effect.... Words are to be interpreted according to the proper
grammatical effect of their arrangement within the statute .... It must be assumed that language
has been chosen with due regard to grammatical propriety and is not interchangeable on mere
conjecture.").
82. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 54, at 2.
83. 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2005) ("No provision of this title shall be construed as indicating an
intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which that provision operates, including
criminal penalties, to the exclusion of any State law on the same subject matter which would
otherwise be within the authority of the State, unless there is a positive conflict between that
provision of this title and that State law so that the two cannot consistently stand together.").
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., McCloskey, supra note 6, at 117-26.
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"switched" vote86 in West Coast Hotel v. Parish8 7 allowed President
Roosevelt's appointees to uphold, in subsequent cases, broad New Deal
legislation premised on the federal commerce power, including the
National Labor Relations Act and the Agricultural Adjustment Act.88
The Commerce Clause's language is facially clear-cut, permitting
Congress "It]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes."89 And this power, as with all
of Congress's enumerated powers, may be combined with the Necessary
and Proper Clause, which states that Congress has the power "[tjo make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execu-
tion the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitu-
tion in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof.""9 However, whether the Tenth Amendment imposes
any affirmative limits on the federal government's enumerated powers is
a question that continues to lurk just beneath the surface.9 1
86. "Franklin Roosevelt was re-elected in November, 1936, by a stunning majority, and after
the dust of the campaign had settled a little, he turned his attention to the hostile Supreme
Court.... [He] presented Congress with a judiciary plan that purported to cope with the supposed
problem of overcrowded federal court dockets. It would have enabled him to appoint a new judge
to supplement any judge over seventy who failed to retire .... The significant fact was that the
plan would permit the President to appoint six new Supreme Court justices." McCloskey, supra
note 6, at 113. "The Court's authority to interpret the Constitution was ... linked to the Court's
separation from politics. For post-World War II constitutional scholars, the most widely known
event suggesting that the Court was engulfed in politics was the 'switch' by Justice Owen Roberts
during the spring of 1937, a switch that many believed was the result of President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt's 'court-packing' plan." Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107
HARV. L. Rav. 620, 622 (1994).
87. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
88. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding Fair
Labor Standards Act legislation); Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding
Agricultural Adjustment Act legislation).
89. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
90. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 411-21
(1819) ("To [Congress's] enumeration of powers is added that of making 'all laws which shall be
necessary and proper, for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers
vested by this constitution, in the government of the United States, or in any department
thereof. . . .' [W]e think the sound construction of the constitution must allow to the national
legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be
carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the
manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are
not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.").
91. See, e.g., Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842 (1976), overruled by Garcia
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) ("'While the Tenth Amendment has
been characterized as a 'truism,' stating merely that 'all is retained which has not been
surrendered,' it is not without significance. The Amendment expressly declares the constitutional
policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their
ability to function effectively in a federal system."' (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542,
547 n.7 (1975))); see also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 580-81
(1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("In my view, federalism cannot be reduced to the weak essence
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Tellingly, even Chief Justice Marshall's broad opinion in Gibbons
v. Ogden acknowledged that there is a sphere of activities exclusively
within a single state, which is inaccessible to the federal government's
commerce power.9 2 The Third Era, which lasted until 1995, however,
obscured, or perhaps destroyed, this limitation. 93
During the early 20th century the Court imposed awkward Com-
merce Clause limitations in defense of unfettered laissez-faire capital-
ism. Distinctions were drawn between direct and indirect effects on
interstate commerce, as well as between local and national activities. 94
Manufacture, production, and labor relations were deemed wholly local
and, hence, off-limits to federal Commerce Clause regulation.95 These
limitations often led to incongruous and absurd results. For example, a
sugar conglomerate, which controlled over ninety-percent of the national
sugar market, was not subject to federal anti-trust regulation because
sugar refining was considered production, and, thus, outside the com-
merce power's scope;96 while cattle stockyards, not directly involved in
distilled by the majority today. There is more to federalism than the nature of the constraints that
can be imposed on the States in the realm of authority left open to them by the Constitution. The
central issue of federalism, of course, is whether any realm is left open to the States by the
Constitution - whether any area remains in which a State may act free of federal interference....
The true essence of federalism is that the States as States have legitimate interests which the
National Government is bound to respect even though its laws are supreme. If federalism so
conceived and so carefully cultivated by the Framers of our Constitution is to remain meaningful,
this Court cannot abdicate its constitutional responsibility to oversee the Federal Government's
compliance with its duty to respect the legitimate interests of the States." (internal citations and
quotations omitted)).
92. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194-95 (1824) ("It is not intended to say that
these words comprehend that commerce, which is completely internal, which is carried on
between man and man in a State, or between different parts of the same State, and which does not
extend to or affect other States. Such a power would be inconvenient, and is certainly
unnecessary.... Comprehensive as the word 'among' is, it may very properly be restricted to that
commerce which concerns more States than one. The phrase is not one which would probably
have been selected to indicate the completely interior traffic of a State, because it is not an apt
phrase for that purpose; and the enumeration of the particular classes of commerce, to which the
power was to be extended, would not have been made, had the intention been to extend the power
to every description. The enumeration presupposes something not enumerated; and that
something, if we regard the language or the subject of the sentence, must be the exclusively
internal commerce of a State.").
93. See, e.g., McCloskey, supra note 6, at 195-200.
94. Id. at 109-13.
95. Id. The Court rejected this distinction in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 113
(1941) ("While manufacture is not of itself interstate commerce, the shipment of manufactured
goods interstate is such commerce and the prohibition of such shipment by Congress is
indubitably a regulation of the commerce. The power to regulate commerce is the power to
prescribe the rule by which commerce is governed. It extends not only to those regulations which
aid, foster and protect the commerce, but embraces those which prohibit it." (internal citations and
quotations omitted)).
96. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12-17 (1895) (interpreting the Commerce
Clause narrowly, thereby excluding manufacturing activities from federal control).
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interstate commerce, but through which cattle intended for interstate
commerce flowed, were deemed regulable under the federal commerce
power.97
The Third Era Court took a major step away from the production-
manufacture limitation in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., where Chief Justice Hughes stated, "[i]t is the
effect upon commerce, not the source of the injury, which is the criterion
[for reviewing Commerce Clause legislation]." 98 That case involved a
multi-national steel corporation's challenge to the National Labor Rela-
tions Act's prohibition of unfair labor practices. Even within that con-
text, Chief Justice Hughes was careful to maintain limits on the
commerce power's reach, stating:
The authority of the federal government may not be pushed to such
an extreme as to destroy the distinction, which the commerce clause
itself establishes, between commerce "among the several States" and
the internal concerns of a State. That distinction between what is
national and what is local in the activities of commerce is vital to the
maintenance of our federal system.99
Such limitations, however, would recede to the background as the
Court became more comfortable with a nearly limitless commerce
power. 100
Another important Third Era decision which bears on Raich is
United States v. Darby. °10 There, the Court not only rejected the distinc-
tion between direct and indirect effects, but also presaged Professor
Wechsler's view that the Tenth Amendment was "but a truism" - that
protection of state sovereignty is guaranteed, not through affirmative
limits on Congress's enumerated powers, but through the states' partici-
pation in the federal government. 10 2 Despite this language, whether the
Tenth Amendment imposes affirmative limitations on the federal exer-
cise of enumerated powers remains a question, as exemplified by the
Raich dissenters.
10 3
97. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398-99 (1905) ("[C]omnimerce among the
States is not a technical legal conception, but a practical one, drawn from the course of business.
When cattle are sent for sale from a place in one State, with the expectation that they will end their
transit, after purchase, in another, and when in effect they do so, with only the interruption
necessary to find a purchaser at the stock yards, and when this is a typical, constantly recurring
course, the current thus existing is a current of commerce among the States, and the purchase of
the cattle is a part and incident of such commerce.").
98. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 32 (1937).
99. Id. at 30.
100. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that a single farmer's wheat,
grown for personal consumption, substantially affected interstate commerce).
101. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
102. Id. at 123-24.
103. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2220 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
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In the wake of Jones and Darby, it was clear that broad commerce
power proponents had prevailed, but their doctrinal expansion did not
end there. Wickard v. Filburn,°4 recognized as perhaps the broadest
Commerce Clause case to date, introduced the Aggregation Principle.'05
Wickard involved the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 ("AAA"),
which, among other things, imposed wheat quotas and assessed fines for
exceeding those quotas. 10 6 The quota-system was intended to stabilize
supply and price levels in the national wheat market."°0 To accomplish
that goal, Congress declared that even local production intended for use
on an individual's farm deprived the wheat market of necessary
demand.'0 8 Wickard was the result of a single farmer's challenge to the
AAA. Filburn, the farmer, had grown above his federally imposed
wheat quota and was fined, but reasoned that his home-grown wheat -
intended to feed his own livestock and family - was beyond the com-
merce power's grip. 10 9
The Court held to the contrary, and in doing so established the
Aggregation Principle: "That appellee's own contribution to the demand
for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the
scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken
together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from triv-
ial." 0 And, "even if appellee's activity be local and though it may not
be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by
Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate com-
merce.""' The Court, however, was explicit in stating the AAA's pur-
pose - "to stimulate trade therein [referring to the national market] at
increased prices.""' 2 That raises the question of whether Filburn's
homegrown wheat would have been federally regulable had the congres-
("We enforce the 'outer limits' of Congress's Commerce Clause authority not for their own sake,
but to protect historic spheres of state sovereignty from excessive federal encroachment and
thereby to maintain the distribution of power fundamental to our federalist system of
government.").
104. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
105. Id. at 127-28 ("That appellee's own contribution to the demand for wheat may be trivial
by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his
contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.").
106. Id. at 114-16.
107. Id. at 128-29.
108. Id. at 127-28.
109. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 119 (1942) ("Appellee says that this is a regulation of
production and consumption of wheat. Such activities are, he urges, beyond the reach of
Congressional power under the Commerce Clause, since they are local in character, and their
effects upon interstate commerce are at most 'indirect.'").
110. Id. at 127-28.
111. Id. at 125.
112. Id. at 129.
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sional goal been to eradicate the intrastate wheat market, rather than
stimulate national wheat prices.
To further complicate this question, the Third Era court fashioned
yet another broad doctrinal tool in Maryland v. Wirtz.' 3 There, the
Court upheld the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act's mini-
mum wage and maximum hours provisions to state hospital and educa-
tion employees who did not participate in interstate commerce."1 4 In
doing so, the Court established the so-called Broader Doctrine or Enter-
prise Theory: "where a general regulatory statute bears a substantial
relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances
arising under that statute is of no consequence."'"15 As we will see, both
Wickard's Aggregation Principle and Wirtz's Enterprise Theory played
an important role in Justice Stevens' Raich opinion." 6
Nevertheless, it is uncertain whether the Court intended that Enter-
prise Theory apply to parties other than enterprises who are, at some
level, engaged in interstate commerce. 1 7 The theory was initially used
merely to regulate the non-interstate aspects of enterprises that partici-
pated in interstate commerce." 8 Clearly, individual medical marijuana
patients are not wholly intrastate employees of an enterprise that is oth-
erwise engaged in interstate commerce.19 Wirtz is important in another
113. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
114. Id. at 193-94 ("The Act establishes only a minimum wage and a maximum limit of hours
unless overtime wages are paid, and does not otherwise affect the way in which school and
hospital duties are performed. Thus appellants' characterization of the question in this case as
whether Congress may, under the guise of the commerce power, tell the States how to perform
medical and educational functions is not factually accurate. Congress has 'interfered with' these
state functions only to the extent of providing that when a State employs people in performing
such functions it is subject to the same restrictions as a wide range of other employers whose
activities affect commerce, including privately operated schools and hospitals .... It is clear that
labor conditions in schools and hospitals can affect commerce. The facts stipulated in this case
indicate that such institutions are major users of goods imported from other States.").
115. Id. at 196.
116. See infra notes 175-76.
117. Alex Kreit, Why is Congress Still Regulating Noncommercial Activity?, 28 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 169, 191 (2004) ("This concept allows Congress to regulate discrete parts of a
business enterprise that may not themselves be economic in isolation but can be seen as
economics within the context of a broader regulatory scheme.") (emphasis supplied); Id. at 183
("[A broader] reading of the doctrine allows Congress to potentially regulate any noncommercial
activity simply by placing it in a broader scheme under the theory that Congress has determined
that regulating the noncommercial activity is helpful to achieving the goals of the broader act.
This is problematic for a number of reasons. First, by focusing on Congress's purpose in enacting
a statute, it gives Congress near limitless power and discretion. Second, to the extent that this
view of the doctrine does place limits on Congress, these limits can be overcome simply by
regulating more broadly, thus creating a perverse incentive for Congress.").
118. Id. at 190-92.
119. Contrary to what some might argue, Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), does not
change this conclusion. That case involved loan shark schemes, which encompassed the entire
nation and were conducted solely for pecuniary gain. Id. at 148-49. Whereas, Raich and Monson
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respect; it further embraced Wechsler's limited conception of
federalism:
But while the commerce power has limits, valid general regulations
of commerce do not cease to be regulations of commerce because a
State is involved. If a State is engaging in economic activities that
are validly regulated by the Federal Government when engaged in by
private persons, the State too may be forced to conform its activities
to federal regulation.' 2°
The Wirtz majority's limited conception of federalism sharply contrasted
with Justice Douglas' passionate dissent, in which he stated:
[W]hat is done here is nonetheless such a serious invasion of state
sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment that it is in my view
not consistent with our constitutional federalism.... The exercise of
the commerce power may... destroy state sovereignty. All activities
affecting commerce, even in the minutest degree, may be regulated
and controlled by Congress. Commercial activity of every stripe may
in some way interfere with the [interstate] flow of merchandise or
interstate travel. The immense scope of this constitutional power is
demonstrated by the Court's approval in this case of regulation on the
basis of the "enterprise concept" - which is entirely proper when the
regulated "businesses" are not essential functions being carried on by
the States. '
2'
Justice Douglas' Wirtz dissent is yet another example of the Court's
struggle with the Tenth Amendment and its appropriate effect on Con-
gress's commerce power. Should it pose an affirmative limit, as Justice
Douglas posits; should Professor Wechsler's thesis prevail; or are there
gray areas of compromise that lay between these two extremes? The
Court overruled Wirtz in its National League of Cities opinion, but
National League of Cities itself was subsequently overruled in Garcia,
thus restoring Wirtz's precedential value.
22
are two extremely sick women who grew their own medical marijuana, with a doctor's
recommendation, consistent with state law, for wholly non-economic reasons.
120. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196-97 (1968).
121. Id. at 201-04 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
122. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976) ("We agree that such assertions
of power, if unchecked, would indeed, as Mr. Justice Douglas cautioned in his dissent in Wirtz,
allow 'the National Government [to] devour the essentials of state sovereignty,' and would
therefore transgress the bounds of the authority granted Congress under the Commerce Clause.
While there are obvious differences between the schools and hospitals involved in Wirtz, and the
fire and police departments affected here, each provides an integral portion of those governmental
services which the States and their political subdivisions have traditionally afforded their citizens.
We are therefore persuaded that Wirtz must be overruled." (emphasis supplied; internal citations
omitted)); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985) ("Our
examination of this 'function' standard applied in these and other cases over the last eight years
now persuades us that the attempt to draw the boundaries of state regulatory immunity in terms of
'traditional governmental function' is not only unworkable but is also inconsistent with
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2. LOPEZ, MORRISON, & THE RISE OF THE FOURTH ERA
When Garcia destroyed the National League of Cities dichotomy,
it appeared that the Tenth Amendment had again receded into the
shadows, but 1995 witnessed its reemergence. Local police arrested
twelfth-grader Alfonso Lopez for possessing a hand gun in a school
zone. 123 Initially, the police charged Lopez with violating Texas state
law; however, the state charges were later dropped and he was prose-
cuted under the harsher federal provision - 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) - which
made it a federal crime "for any individual knowingly to possess a fire-
arm at a place that [he] knows... is a school zone." 124 The Court faced
the question of whether this statute exceeded the scope of Congress's
commerce power. The majority led by Chief Justice Rehnquist
responded in the affirmative.
125
Chief Justice Rehnquist first withheld application of the Aggrega-
tion Principle and noted the absence of a jurisdictional element linking
the firearm in issue to interstate commerce. 126  Second, Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted that Section 922(q) was not "an essential part of a
larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme
could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated," thereby
refusing to apply Enterprise Theory.
1 27
Third, Chief Justice Rehnquist reemphasized the lack of a jurisdic-
tional element:
§ 922(q) contains no jurisdictional element that would ensure,
through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearms possession in question
affects interstate commerce .... Respondent was a local student at a
local school; there is no indication that he had recently moved in
interstate commerce, and there is no requirement that his possession
of the firearm have any concrete tie to interstate commerce.1
28
Fourth and finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted: (1) the lack of
congressional findings concerning the economic impact of school-zone
established principles of federalism and, indeed, with those very federalism principles on which
National League of Cities purported to rest. That case, accordingly, is overruled." (emphasis
supplied)).
123. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
124. Id.
125. Id. ("We hold that the Act exceeds the authority of Congress 'to regulate Commerce ...
among the several States ... ' (citing U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3)).
126. Id. at 567 ("The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic
activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate
commerce. Respondent was a local student at a local school; there is no indication that he had
recently moved in interstate commerce, and there is no requirement that his possession of the
firearm have any concrete tie to interstate commerce.").
127. Id. at 561.
128. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561, 567 (1995).
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gun possession on interstate commerce; and (2) the Court's disapproval
of reasoning, which connects the regulated activity to interstate com-
merce via an inference upon an inference.
29
In assessing Lopez's impact, it is important to note that the Court
did not overrule any Third Era cases, including Wickard and Wirtz.
Nevertheless, the Lopez dissenters, foremost among them Justice Souter,
were shocked by what they perceived as a return to the Second Era dis-
tinction between direct and indirect effects and the Court's abandonment
of its prior commitment to reviewing Commerce Clause legislation from
a "rational basis"130 perspective. 13 In fact, the dissenters openly specu-
lated that the majority's opinion was a sheer "misstep" that would not
last. '
32
Their speculation proved unwarranted, as Chief Justice Rehnquist
reaffirmed the Court's commitment to Lopez in Morrison.133 Morrison
involved a challenge to the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA").1
34
The Court held that the VAWA exceeded the Commerce Clause's scope,
and in doing so clarified the Lopez framework.'35 To briefly reiterate,
the Lopez-Morrison framework is as follows: (1) does the case involve
129. Id. at 567-68 ("To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to pile
inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under
the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States. Admittedly,
some of our prior cases have taken long steps down that road, giving great deference to
congressional action. The broad language in these opinions has suggested the possibility of
additional expansion, but we decline here to proceed any further. To do so would require us to
conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of powers does not presuppose something not
enumerated, and that there never will be a distinction between what is truly national and what is
truly local. This we are unwilling to do." (internal citations omitted)).
130. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964) (holding that "where we
find that the legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis for
finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our investigation is
at an end" (emphasis supplied)).
131. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 608-09 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The
distinction between what is patently commercial and what is not looks much like the old
distinction between what directly affects commerce and what touches it only indirectly .... Thus,
it seems fair to ask whether the step taken by the Court today does anything but portend a return to
the untenable jurisprudence from which the Court extricated itself almost 60 years ago.").
132. Id. at 614-15 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Because Justice Breyer's opinion demonstrates
beyond any doubt that the Act in question passes the rationality review that the Court continues to
espouse, today's decision may be seen as only a misstep, its reasoning and its suggestions not
quite in gear with the prevailing standard, but hardly an epochal case.").
133. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
134. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000).
135. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-618 ("We accordingly reject the argument that Congress may
regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on
interstate commerce. The Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and
what is truly local."); Id. at 609 ("Since Lopez most recently canvassed and clarified our case law
governing this third category of Commerce Clause regulation, it provides the proper framework
for conducting the required analysis of § 13981.").
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"substantial effects" legislation; (2) if so, is the regulatory subject matter
commercial or non-commercial; (3) is there a jurisdictional element
ensuring a connection to interstate commerce; (4) are there congres-
sional findings demonstrating a connection to interstate commerce; and
(5) is the purported effect on interstate commerce attenuated - is it pred-
icated upon an inference upon an inference? 36 Given this framework, it
remains unsettled how the Court's Third Era doctrinal tools, such as
Wickard's Aggregation Principle and Wirtz's Enterprise Theory, com-
plete the commerce analysis puzzle.
In Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist found each tool inapplicable.
37
Recall, the Aggregation Principle did not apply because gun possession
was non-economic, which implies that Filburn's wheat production in
Wickard was somehow economic, despite Justice Jackson's suggestion
that Filburn's activity "may not be regarded as commerce." ' 38 Enter-
prise Theory's inapplicability, on the other hand, could be interpreted in
at least two ways: (1) § 922(q)'s circle of regulation was drawn nar-
rowly, regulating at the individual, rather than enterprise, level; or (2) in
an as-applied challenge to commerce regulation, the Court looks at the
individual involved - and Lopez was assuredly not a part of a business
enterprise operating in interstate commerce. The former interpretation
would give Congress the incentive to legislate on a broad scale, while
the latter interpretation would return to the states some exclusive control
over local activities. The issue remains whether the Aggregation Princi-
ple or Enterprise Theory may save "substantial effects" Commerce
Clause legislation that fails the Lopez-Morrison framework. With that
issue at the forefront, we move to Gonzales v. Raich.
III. GONZALES V. RAICH
A. Facts & Procedure
The respondents, Angel Raich ("Raich") and Diane Monson
("Monson"), are California citizens, each of which has serious medical
problems. Raich was diagnosed with "more than ten serious medical
conditions, including an inoperable brain tumor, life-threatening weight
136. Id. at 610-13.
137. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 ("Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing
to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define
those terms. Section 922(q) is not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in
which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. It
cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of
or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially
affects interstate commerce." (emphasis supplied)).
138. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2205-06 (2005) (quoting Wickard v. Filbum, 317
U.S. I I1, 125 (1942)).
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loss, a seizure disorder, nausea, and several chronic pain disorders."' 13 9
Whereas, Monson was diagnosed with a degenerative spinal condition
that causes "severe chronic back pain and constant, painful muscle
spasms."' 4 ° Per their doctors' recommendations, they obtained medical
marijuana in compliance with the California CUA. 14' Monson culti-
vated her own supply of marijuana, while Raich, due to her condition,
enlisted the help of caregivers to grow her medical marijuana.' 4 2 Each
of their physicians attempted treatment with conventional drugs before
resorting to medical marijuana.'43 Additionally, both physicians came
to the conclusion that "marijuana [was] the only drug available that pro-
vide[d] effective treatment.' 44
County sheriffs and DEA agents raided Monson's home on August
15, 2002. 4' The California officers determined that Monson's mari-
juana cultivation and possession was authorized under California law.
The DEA agents, however, seized and destroyed all six of Monson's
marijuana plants.1 46 Due to the looming threat of federal prosecution,
the respondents brought an action in United States District Court, seek-
ing "injunctive and declaratory relief prohibiting the enforcement of the
[CSA], to the extent it prevent[ed] them from possessing, obtaining, or
manufacturing cannabis for their personal medical use."' 147 The District
Court denied the respondents' motion for a preliminary injunction, but
the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the respondents "demonstrated a
strong likelihood of success on their claim that, as applied to them, the
CSA is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause
authority." 
148
The Ninth Circuit applied the Lopez-Morrison framework in a man-
ner consistent with a prior Ninth Circuit case, United States v. McCoy. 49
At the outset, Judge Pregerson, writing for the majority, addressed the
question of which of the three permissible Commerce Clause categories
applied: (1) the channels of interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentali-
ties of interstate commerce; or (3) activities that substantially affect
139. Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Gonzales v.





144. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2200 (2005).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 2200.
148. Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 2003).
149. 323 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2003).
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interstate commerce. 5 ° The Court found that the third category
applied. 5 ' Next, Judge Pregerson assessed each of the four remaining
Lopez-Morrison prongs.
Because the case involved an as-applied challenge, the Ninth Cir-
cuit's review was narrow - interpreting the CSA's application only to
those California citizens, like Raich and Monson, who cultivated and
used marijuana for medical purposes pursuant to a valid doctor recom-
mendation.' 52 Under the second Lopez-Morrison prong - whether the
regulated activity is commercial or non-commercial - the Ninth Circuit
held:
As applied to the limited class of activities presented by this case, the
CSA does not regulate commerce or any sort of economic enterprise.
The cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana for medicinal pur-
poses and not for exchange or distribution is not properly character-
ized as commercial or economic activity. Lacking sale, exchange or
distribution, the activity does not possess the essential elements of
commerce. 1
53
Hence, the second prong militated in favor of the respondents. The
Court then moved to the third prong - whether there is a jurisdictional
element establishing a connection to interstate commerce. Judge Preger-
son determined that there was no "jurisdictional hook" ensuring that the
marijuana involved had ever, or would ever move in interstate com-
merce; therefore, he concluded, "[the third prong] favors a finding that
Congress has exceeded its powers under the Commerce Clause. '
In assessing the fourth prong - Congress's legislative findings - the
Court held that while the CSA's findings did not explicitly address mari-
juana,' 55 they did "provide some evidence that intrastate possession of
controlled substances may impact interstate commerce. Therefore, the
[fourth] factor weighs in favor of finding the CSA constitutional under
the Commerce Clause." '156 Finally, the Court held that the fifth prong -
whether the connection between the regulated activity and the effect on
150. Raich v. Ashc: oft, 352 F.3d at 1229.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1228 ("But here the appellants are not only claiming that their activities do not have
the same effect on interstate commerce as activities in other cases where the CSA has been
upheld. Rather, they contend that, whereas the earlier cases concerned drug trafficking, the
appellants' conduct constitutes a separate and distinct class of activities: the intrastate,
noncommercial cultivation and possession of cannabis for personal medical purposes as
recommended by a patient's physician pursuant to valid California state law.").
153. Id. at 1229-30.
154. Id. at 1231.
155. See 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2005).
156. Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1232 (9th Cir. 2003).
[Vol. 61:237
Guns, Drugs, and... Federalism? Gonzales v. Raich
interstate commerce was too attenuated - militated in favor of the
respondents:
The connections in this case are, indeed, attenuated. Presumably, the
intrastate cultivation, possession and use of medical marijuana on the
recommendation of a physician could, at the margins, have an effect
on interstate commerce by reducing the demand for marijuana that is
trafficked interstate. It is far from clear that such an effect would be
substantial. The congressional findings provide no guidance in this
respect, as they do not address the activities at issue in the present
case.... Therefore, we conclude that this factor favors a finding that
the CSA cannot constitutionally be applied to the class of activities at
issue in this case. 157
In sum, the Ninth Circuit held that three out of the four remaining
Lopez-Morrison prongs militated in favor of the respondents, Raich and
Monson. The Ninth Circuit's holding was specific and did not deem the
CSA unconstitutional; rather, Judge Pregerson stated:
On the basis of our consideration of the [five Lopez-Morrison] fac-
tors, we find that the CSA, as applied to the appellants, is likely
unconstitutional. . . . Therefore, we find that the appellants have
made a strong showing of the likelihood of success on the merits of
their case. 158
The Ninth Circuit majority also found that Wickard's Aggregation
Principle did not apply to the respondents' activities, which were non-
commercial in character.' 59 The majority relied on Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's Lopez language indicating that Filburn's wheat growing activities
were commercial in character: "In every case where we have sustained
federal regulation under the aggregation principle in Wickard . . . the
regulated activity was of an apparent commercial character."6 ' Wirtz's
Enterprise Theory was likewise inapplicable. Judge Pregerson skillfully
distinguished the respondents from the "enterprise" Congress sought to
regulate via the CSA:
Clearly, the way in which the activity or class of activities is defined
is critical. We find that the [respondents'] class of activities - the
intrastate, noncommercial cultivation, possession and use of mari-
juana for personal medical purposes on the advice of a physician - is,
in fact, different in kind from drug trafficking.' 6 '
Thus, neither of the doctrinal tools that could have sustained the
157. Id. at 1233.
158. Id. at 1234 (emphasis supplied; internal citations and quotations omitted).
159. Id. at 1230 ("As the regulated activity in this case is not commercial, Wickard's
aggregation analysis is not applicable.").
160. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 n.4 (2000) (emphasis supplied).
161. Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d at 1228.
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CSA, as-applied to the respondents, was applicable. The respondents'
behavior was non-commercial, hence, no Aggregation Principle; addi-
tionally, the respondents were not part of the drug-trafficking enterprise
that Congress sought to regulate, hence, no Enterprise Theory.
On April 20, 2004, the Attorney General sought Supreme Court
certiorari, arguing that the CSA erected a "comprehensive federal
scheme to regulate the market in controlled substances" and "a closed
system of drug distribution," which was incompatible with state legali-
zation of medical marijuana. 162 The respondents submitted their Brief in
Opposition on June 7, 2004, arguing that:
[F]urther proceedings in the district court [would] produce a more
complete record and findings of fact. A complete factual record is
likely to shed light on a range of issues .. .including whether the
activities of similarly-situated individuals substantially affect inter-
state commerce. 1
63
The respondents distinguished Wickard and Wirtz and applied the
Lopez-Morrison framework in a similar fashion as the Ninth Circuit had
below." 6 Also of note was the respondents' claim that medical care is a
traditional area of state regulation, where Tenth Amendment and state
sovereignty concerns command attention.
65
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and determined that the per-
tinent issue was:
[W]hether the power vested in Congress by Article I, § 8, of the Con-
stitution '[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution' its authority to 'regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States' includes the power to
prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance with
California law. 1
66
In a 6-3 decision the Court held that, in combination, the Commerce
Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause did indeed permit Congress
to constitutionally "prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana in
compliance with California law."'
167
B. Justice Stevens' Majority Opinion - The Lopez-Morrison
Framework Unjustifiably Abandoned
Justice Stevens' majority opinion began in much the same fashion
162. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 54, at 2.
163. Respondents' Brief in Opposition at 11, Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) (No.
03-1454), available at 2004 WL 1329967 (internal citations omitted).
164. Id. at 12-22.
165. Id. at 22.
166. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2199 (2005).
167. Id.
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as Judge Pregerson's - by acknowledging the limited nature of the
respondents' challenge:
[R]espondents' challenge is actually quite limited; they argue that the
CSA's categorical prohibition of the manufacture and possession of
marijuana as applied to the intrastate manufacture and possession of
marijuana for medical purposes pursuant to California law exceeds
Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause. 1
68
That, however, is where the similarities ended. In stark contrast to
Judge Pregerson's Ninth Circuit opinion, Justice Stevens made no dis-
cernible effort to apply the Lopez-Morrison framework; instead, his
opinion is premised upon a combination of Wickard's Aggregation Prin-
ciple and Wirtz's Enterprise Theory.
169
Justice Stevens outlined the now familiar trio of permissible Com-
merce Clause regulation categories and stated that "[o]nly the third cate-
gory is implicated in the case at hand" (i.e. activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce).' 70 The first pages of analysis expose a sub-
tle doctrinal shift - "[o]ur case law firmly establishes Congress' power
to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic 'class of
activities' that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce."'' This
language hinted that the respondents' as-applied challenge was for
naught; the Court would simply group their local non-economic activity
into a broader economic class of activities.
This linguistic choice gives Congress a tremendous incentive to
legislate broadly, thereby capturing activities which at the individual
level are wholly non-economic, but which at the macroeconomic level
can be grouped into a larger economic class of activities.7 2 For exam-
ple, non-economic possession of a homegrown commodity can almost
always be cast into a broader economic class of activities because a mar-
ket competitor exists. 173 In other words, one's choice to grow at home
168. Id. at 2204-05.
169. Id. at 2206.
170. Id. at 2205.
171. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2205 (2005).
172. Id. at 2238 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The intrastate conduct swept within a general
regulatory scheme may or may not have a substantial effect on the relevant interstate market.
[O]ne always can draw the circle broadly enough to cover an activity that, when taken in isolation,
would not have substantial effects on commerce. The breadth of legislation that Congress enacts
says nothing about whether the intrastate activity substantially affects interstate commerce, let
alone whether it is necessary to the scheme." (internal citations and quotations omitted)).
173. Id. at 2225 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("It will not do to say that Congress may regulate
noncommercial activity simply because it may have an effect on the demand for commercial
goods, or because the noncommercial endeavor can, in some sense, substitute for commercial
activity. Most commercial goods or services have some sort of privately producible analogue.
Home care substitutes for daycare. Charades games substitute for movie tickets. Backyard or
windowsill gardening substitutes for going to the supermarket. To draw the line wherever private
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affects the market competitor's supply and demand. This entails a doc-
trinal shift because the Lopez and Morrison majorities sought to provide
incentives for Congress to legislate narrowly, to preserve an area of state
sovereignty. 1
74
Early on, Justice Stevens quoted both Wickard and Wirtz, which
foreshadowed their all-encompassing importance throughout the Raich
majority opinion:
[E]ven if [Filburn's] activity be local and though it may not be
regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by
Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate com-
merce.... 171 [W]hen 'a general regulatory statute bears a substantial
relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual
instances arising under that statute is of no consequence.' 
176
The opinion thereafter segued into a comprehensive Wickard analogy.
Justice Stevens stated Wickard stands for the proposition "that Congress
can regulate purely intrastate activity that is not itself 'commercial,' in
that it is not produced for sale, if it concludes that failure to regulate that
class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate market in
that commodity."
' 177
Justice Stevens observed that Raich and Monson, like Filburn, "are
cultivating, for home consumption, a fungible commodity for which
there is an established, albeit illegal, interstate market."'' 78 The congres-
sional legislation at issue in Wickard and Raich is also analogized:
Just as the Agricultural Adjustment Act was designed to control the
volume [of wheat] moving in interstate and foreign commerce in
order to avoid surpluses . . . and consequently control the market
price, a primary purpose of the CSA is to control the supply and
demand of controlled substances in both lawful and unlawful drug
markets. '
79
He found that "Congress had a rational basis for concluding that leaving
home-consumed marijuana outside federal control would similarly affect
price and market conditions." ' 80 In doing so, he assumed - without sup-
porting data - that seriously ill patients cultivating and using medical
marijuana, like Monson and Raich, would inevitably cause a substantial
activity affects the demand for market goods is to draw no line at all, and to declare everything
economic. We have already rejected the result that would follow - a federal police power.").
174. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995).
175. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2205-06 (2005) (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111, 125 (1942)).
176. Id. at 2206 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 (1968)).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 2206-07 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
180. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2207 (2005).
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diversion of medical marijuana into the illicit drug market, thus "frus-
trat[ing] the federal interest in eliminating commercial transactions in
the interstate market in their entirety."'
' 81
The Court, through Justice Stevens, rejected the respondents'
attempts to distinguish Wickard. First, he found it irrelevant that the
AAA, at issue in Wickard, exempted small farming operations as this
merely reflected the Secretary of Agriculture's policy choice, not the
extent of Congress's power to reach smaller farms.' 82 Second, he was
not convinced that Filburn's status as a commercial farmer played a role
in the Court's Wickard decision - "even though [Filburn] was indeed a
commercial farmer, the activity he was engaged in - the cultivation of
wheat for home consumption - was not treated by the Court as part of
his commercial farming operation."183 Finally, Justice Stevens found
that Congress included CSA findings that the local incidents of con-
trolled substance production and possession affect interstate
commerce. 
84
The majority engaged in a bare rational basis review, without
applying the Lopez-Morrison framework. 85 Justice Stevens was con-
tent to distinguish Lopez and Morrison by noting that Lopez and Morri-
son involved facial challenges, whereas "respondents ask[ed] [the Court]
to excise individual applications of a concededly valid statutory
scheme."'' 86 Again, this provides Congress with the incentive to legis-
late broadly.' 87 Lopez and Morrison involved congressional legislation
that was comparatively narrow in scope (gun possession in school zones
and gender-motivated violence respectively) and thus subject to facial
challenge, 18 8 whereas Raich involved a broad "statutory scheme," (regu-




184. Id. at 2208.
185. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2208 (2005) ("[W]e stress that the task before us is a
modest one. We need not determine whether respondents' activities, taken in the aggregate,
substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a 'rational basis' exists for so
concluding.").
186. Id. at 2209.
187. Id. at 2221 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Today the Court sanctions an application of the
federal Controlled Substances Act that extinguishes that experiment, without any proof that the
personal cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana for medicinal purposes, if economic activity
in the first place, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce and is therefore an appropriate
subject of federal regulation. In so doing, the Court announces a rule that gives Congress a
perverse incentive to legislate broadly pursuant to the Commerce Clause - nestling questionable
assertions of its authority into comprehensive regulatory schemes - rather than with precision.").
188. Id. at 2209 ("At issue in Lopez, was the validity of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of
1990, which was a brief, single-subject statute making it a crime for an individual to possess a gun
in a school zone. The Act did not regulate any economic activity and did not contain any
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would not "excise individual applications."' 89 Such a distinction merely
endorses Congress's decision to enact a more ambitious legislative
scheme, thereby encouraging the federal government to co-opt even
more state police power.
The Court cut off the respondents' as-applied challenge by stating
that marijuana's classification as a Schedule I drug "was merely one of
many 'essential part[s] of a larger regulation of economic activity, in
which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate
activity were regulated.' "190 This was contrasted with "the discrete pro-
hibition established by the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990,"'9' at
issue in Lopez.
Morrison was similarly distinguished. There and in Lopez, "the
noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct at issue was central to [the
Court's] decision. '"192 Justice Stevens concluded that marijuana regula-
tion is "quintessentially economic,"' 9 3 compared to the relevant activity
in Morrison - violence against women - which was "not, in any sense
of the phrase, economic activity." '94 The majority further emphasized
both the CSA's economic nature and the rational-basis nature of the
Court's review:
The CSA is a statute that regulates the production, distribution, and
consumption of commodities for which there is an established, and
lucrative, interstate market. Prohibiting the intrastate possession or
manufacture of an article of commerce is a rational (and commonly
utilized) means of regulating commerce in that product.'95
A key factor in the Court's rational basis review was Congress's asser-
tion that "[c]ontrolled substances manufactured and distributed intrastate
cannot be differentiated from controlled substances manufactured and
distributed interstate."'' 96 Justice Stevens found that Congress's decision
to regulate the local incidents of controlled substance production and
possession was rationally based on Congress's declaration that these
requirement that the possession of a gun have any connection to past interstate activity or a
predictable impact on future commercial activity." (internal citations and quotations omitted)).
189. Id. at 2210 ("The statutory scheme that the Government is defending in this litigation is at
the opposite end of the regulatory spectrum. As explained above, the CSA, enacted in 1970 as
part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, was a lengthy and detailed
statute creating a comprehensive framework for regulating the production, distribution, and
possession of five classes of controlled substances." (internal citations omitted)).
190. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2210 (2005) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 561 (1995)).
191. Id.
192. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000).
193. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2211.
194. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
195. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2211 (emphasis supplied).
196. 21 U.S.C. § 801(5) (2005).
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local incidents are indistinguishable from national incidents.' 97 This
deference to Congress's blanket statement, however, ignores the highly
distinguishable situation of someone like Monson, who state authorities
expressly found personally grew and consumed her medical marijuana,
locally in a non-commercial manner, and in compliance with state
law. 198
Ultimately, Justice Stevens refused to analyze Congress's decision
to regulate the loca. incidents of marijuana possession, production, and
use because "Congress could have rationally concluded that the aggre-
gate impact on the national market of all the transactions exempted from
federal supervision is unquestionably substantial."' 99 Furthermore, he
declined to thoroughly explore the congressional findings regarding
marijuana because the Court:
[Has] never required Congress to make particularized findings in
order to legislate. . . . While congressional findings are certainly
helpful in reviewing the substance of a congressional statutory
scheme, particularly when the connection to commerce is not self-
evident, and while we will consider congressional findings in our
analysis when they are available, the absence of particularized find-
ings does not call into question Congress' authority to legislate.20 °
This statement rejects, without explanation, the role that congressional
findings play in the fourth Lopez-Morrison prong.20
Justice Stevens closed by exploring the Supremacy Clause's 0 2
impact on the CSA-CUA collision. Within his Supremacy Clause analy-
sis, he quoted questionable language from Wirtz and Sanitary District of
Chicago v. United States: "It is beyond peradventure that federal power
over commerce is 'superior to that of the States to provide for the wel-
fare or necessities of their inhabitants,' however legitimate or dire those
necessities may be."2 3 This language is questionable because Justice
197. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2213 (2005) ("The notion that California law has
surgically excised a discrete activity that is hermetically sealed off from the larger interstate
marijuana market is a dubious proposition, and, more importantly, one that Congress could have
rationally rejected.").
198. Id. at 2200.
199. Id. at 2215.
200. Id. at 2208 n.32.
201. Id. at 2222 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Third, we found telling the absence of legislative
findings about the regulated conduct's impact on interstate commerce. We explained that while
express legislative findings are neither required nor, when provided, dispositive, findings 'enable
us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affect[s] interstate
commerce, even though no such substantial effect [is] visible to the naked eye."' (quoting United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563 (1995)).
202. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
203. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2212 (2005) (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S.
183, 196 (1968)).
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Douglas' dissent in Wirtz,2 °4 Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in
National League of Cities,205 and Justice O'Connor's dissent in Gar-
cia2 16 all indicate that this sort of reasoning conflicts with the Tenth
Amendment. The Tenth Amendment's significance, undoubtedly,
remains a tough point of contention.
Relatedly, Justice Stevens alluded to Professor Wechsler's thesis -
protection of state sovereignty lies in the political process, not in judicial
enforcement of supposed limits imposed by the Tenth Amendment.
20
His allusion, perhaps unintentionally, reintroduced the question of
whether the Tenth Amendment imposes any limits on the commerce
power. Furthermore, he punched the Court's return ticket to a bygone
age - next stop: the Third Era and a nearly limitless commerce power.
The Court issued a Wickard-centered holding that ignored the
Lopez-Morrison framework without sufficient explanation. Specifically,
the Court found congressional prohibition of locally cultivated, pos-
sessed, and utilized medical marijuana by seriously ill individuals in
compliance with state law, rational per the CSA's findings.2 °8 For that
reason, California's CUA cannot legalize such activity because "the
CSA would still impose controls beyond what is required by California
law."2 o9
C. Justice Scalia's Concurrence - Drugs Trump State Sovereignty
Justice Scalia's concurrence primarily rehashed the majority's rea-
soning.2 The concurrence's noteworthy aspect is its emphasis on the
interplay between the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper
Clause. To be sure, Justice Stevens mentioned the interplay, even
expressly incorporating it into his statement of the issue.2,' Justice
Scalia, though, specifically focused on this interplay to justify the con-
204. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 201-05 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
205. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
206. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 580-89 (1985).
207. Justice Stevens stated that "perhaps even more important than these legal avenues is the
democratic process, in which the voices of voters allied with these respondents may one day be
heard in the halls of Congress." Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2214-15.
208. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2206 (2005).
209. Id. at 2212.
210. Id. at 2215 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I agree with the Court's holding that the Controlled
Substances Act (CSA) may validly be applied to respondents' cultivation, distribution, and
possession of marijuana for personal, medicinal use. I write separately because my understanding
of the doctrinal foundation on which that holding rests is, if not inconsistent with that of the Court,
at least more nuanced.").
211. Id. at 2198 ("[W]hether the power vested in Congress by Article I, § 8, of the Constitution
'[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution' its authority
to 'regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States' includes the power to
prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance with California law.").
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tinuing validity of Lopez and Morrison's holdings, Wickard's Aggrega-
tion Principle, and Wirtz's Enterprise Theory.2 12 That of course
introduces the question of whether such reconciliation is meaningful,
especially if it renders the Lopez-Morrison framework a mere
formalism.
21 3
Justice Scalia identified the Necessary and Proper Clause as the
origin of the substantial effects category of Commerce Clause regula-
tion: "Congress's regulatory authority over intrastate activities that are
not themselves part of interstate commerce (including activities that
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce) derives from the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause. 21 4  He framed the inquiry as "whether the
means chosen are 'reasonably adapted' to the attainment of a legitimate
end under the commerce power. "215 He was careful to point out, how-
ever, that:
[T]he Necessary and Proper Clause does not give "Congress ... the
authority to regulate the internal commerce of a State, as such," but it
does allow Congress "to take all measures necessary or appropriate
to" the effective regulation of the interstate market, "although intra-
state transactions ... may thereby be controlled. '216
He then attempted to reconcile the Lopez-Morrison framework with
the majority's holding. First, Justice Scalia noted that both "Lopez and
Morrison recognized the expansive scope of Congress's authority in this
regard: '[T]he pattern is clear. Where economic activity substantially
affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be
212. Id. at 2216 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Congress's regulatory authority over intrastate
activities that are not themselves part of interstate commerce (including activities that have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce) derives from the Necessary and Proper Clause. And the
category of activities that substantially affect interstate commerce, is incomplete because the
authority to enact laws necessary and proper for the regulation of interstate commerce is not
limited to laws governing intrastate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Where
necessary to make a regulation of interstate commerce effective, Congress may regulate even
those intrastate activities that do not themselves substantially affect interstate commerce ...
Lopez and Morrison recognized the expansive scope of Congress's authority in this regard: '[Tihe
pattern is clear. Where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation
regulating that activity will be sustained."' (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560;
(1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000) (internal citations omitted))).
213. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2223 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Lopez and
Morrison did not indicate that the constitutionality of federal regulation depends on superficial
and formalistic distinctions. Likewise I did not understand our discussion of the role of courts in
enforcing outer limits of the Commerce Clause for the sake of maintaining the federalist balance
our Constitution requires, as a signal to Congress to enact legislation that is more extensive and
more intrusive into the domain of state power. If the Court always defers to Congress as it does
today, little may be left to the notion of enumerated powers." (internal citations omitted)).
214. Id. at 2216 (Scalia, J., concurring).
215. Id. at 2217 (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
216. Id. at 2218 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342, 353
(1914)).
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sustained.' "217 Second, he quoted Lopez for the proposition that even
though "the conduct in Lopez was not economic, the Court nevertheless
recognized that it could be regulated as 'an essential part of a larger
regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could
be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.' "2 I8 Third, he
claimed this language reconciled Lopez and Morrison with congres-
sional regulation of purely local intrastate activities "in connection with
a more comprehensive scheme of regulation." '219 Justice Scalia's read-
ing of Lopez and Morrison would limit their collective holding to this:
Congress may not regulate certain "purely local" activity within the
States based solely on the attenuated effect that such activity may
have in the interstate market. But those decisions do not declare
noneconomic intrastate activities to be categorically beyond the reach
of the Federal Government.22°
In short, if legislated in isolation, Justice Scalia would prohibit con-
gressional regulation of the entirely local possession of commodities,
like guns or marijuana. If, however, congressional regulation of local
possession is included in a "comprehensive scheme of regulation," Jus-
tice Scalia would find such regulation within Congress's grasp.22' This
line of reasoning would foreclose as-applied challenges, which in Justice
Scalia's view "undercut" the regulatory scheme. In fact, he explicitly
stated in his concurrence "[tihat simple possession is a noneconomic
activity is immaterial to whether it can be prohibited as a necessary part
of a larger regulation. 22 Surprisingly, Justice Scalia openly castigated
Justice O'Connor for labeling his distinction formalistic, but his only
criticism was that Justice O'Connor "misunderstand [s] the nature of the
Necessary and Proper Clause, which empowers Congress to enact laws
in effectuation of its enumerated powers that are not within its authority
to enact in isolation. 223
If, however, the Tenth Amendment is more than a truism, Justice
O'Connor's characterization of Justice Scalia's distinction as mere for-
malism makes sense. For instance, if the Tenth Amendment imposes
limitations on congressional power, those limitations would reach the
Necessary and Proper Clause, where Congress attempted to use it in
combination with the Commerce Clause to impermissibly interfere with
217. Id. at 2216 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560;
(1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000)) (emphasis supplied).
218. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2216 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Lopez,
514 U.S. at 561).
219. Id. at 2218 (Scalia, J., concurring).
220. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
221. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
222. Id. at 2219 (Scalia, J., concurring).
223. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2218 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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the states' police powers.2 24 Such a formalistic distinction would
impede the Lopez-Morrison framework's goal - preserving a local
sphere for state police power regulation.225 Justice Scalia's distinction
produces a Lopez-Morrison framework devoid of significance. Con-
gress may reach wholly local activities that would otherwise be regu-
lated by the states, by including them in a "comprehensive scheme of
regulation."
226
It is imperceptible, to this reader, how Justice Scalia's take on the
Lopez-Morrison framework contributes to avoiding the creation of a
completely centralized government. Quite the contrary, Justice Scalia's
concurrence, along with Justice Stevens' majority opinion, encourages
Congress to legislate broadly by regulating activities that, individually,
are non-commercial and local.227 Justice Scalia's concurrence perfectly
illustrates the Lopez-Morrison framework's newfound futility - it is pro-
cedural formalism, rather than an affirmative limit on Congress's com-
merce power.228
D. Justice O'Connor's Dissent - Wholly Intrastate Medical
Marijuana Legalization Implicates State Sovereignty &
Demands a Lopez-Morrison Analysis
Justice O'Connor had four interrelated qualms with the majority
and concurring opinions: (1) our system of Dual Federalism and Tenth
Amendment concerns should have been factors in the Court's deci-
sion;229 (2) Congress's asserted need to regulate the local incidents of
224. Id. at 2226 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Congress must exercise its authority under the
Necessary and Proper Clause in a manner consistent with basic constitutional principles. As
Justice Scalia recognizes, Congress cannot use its authority under the Clause to contravene the
principle of state sovereignty embodied in the Tenth Amendment. Likewise, that authority must
be used in a manner consistent with the notion of enumerated powers - a structural principle that
is as much part of the Constitution as the Tenth Amendment's explicit textual command.
Accordingly, something more than mere assertion is required when Congress purports to have
power over local activity whose connection to an intrastate market is not self-evident." (internal
citations and quotations omitted)).
225. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995).
226. Id. at 600 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[O]ne always can draw the circle broadly enough to
cover an activity that, when taken in isolation, would not have substantial effects on commerce.").
227. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2221 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court announces a rule that
gives Congress a perverse incentive to legislate broadly pursuant to the Commerce Clause -
nestling questionable assertions of its authority into comprehensive regulatory schemes - rather
than with precision.").
228. Id. at 2223 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (observing that the majority and concurrence's
reading of Lopez and Morrison reduce them to "nothing more than a drafting guide.").
229. Id. at 2224 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[Blecause fundamental structural concerns about
dual sovereignty animate our Commerce Clause cases, it is relevant that this case involves the
interplay of federal and state regulation in areas of criminal law and social policy, where States lay
claim by right of history and expertise." (internal citations and quotations omitted)).
2006]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
medical marijuana use and production to avoid undercutting the CSA, is
just that - a mere assertion;23 (3) the Court ignored stare decisis by
straying from the Lopez-Morrison framework;2 3' and (4) the majority's
holding creates a "perverse incentive for Congress to legislate broadly,"
thereby co-opting traditional areas of state regulation.232
Instead of distinguishing Lopez and Morrison, as Justices Stevens
and Scalia were content to do, Justice O'Connor sought to apply the
Lopez-Morrison framework's underlying rationale: to preserve a local
sphere for state police power regulation and thereby avoid creating a
completely centralized government. 33 Justice O'Connor opined that
she did not personally agree with medical marijuana legalization and
would have voted against Proposition 215,234 but she also declared that a
prime virtue of federalism is that it enables individual states to experi-
ment with legislation that is currently unpopular in other states and in
Washington, D.C.
235
An important consideration, which played little or no part in the
majority and concurring opinions, was the fact that, unlike Wickard,
Raich involved a state's attempt to exercise its retained police powers.23 6
Justice O'Connor realized this and she focused on the limits that should
apply where the federal government legislates in derogation of the
states' ability to exercise their police powers:
We enforce the "outer limits" of Congress' Commerce Clause author-
ity not for their own sake, but to protect historic spheres of state sov-
ereignty from excessive federal encroachment and thereby to
maintain the distribution of power fundamental to our federalist sys-
230. Id. at 2227 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[Congress's CSA findings] amount to nothing
more than a legislative insistence that the regulation of controlled substances must be absolute.
They are asserted without any supporting evidence - descriptive, statistical, or otherwise.
'[Slimply because Congress may conclude a particular activity substantially affects interstate
commerce does not necessarily make it so."' (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 311 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment))).
231. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2221 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
232. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
233. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995).
234. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2229 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 2220 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("One of federalism's chief virtues, of course, is
that it promotes innovation by allowing for the possibility that 'a single courageous State may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country."' (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))).
236. Id. at 2221 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[Raich] exemplifies the role of States as
laboratories. The States' core police powers have always included authority to define criminal
law and to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens. Exercising those powers,
California (by ballot initiative and then by legislative codification) has come to its own conclusion
about the difficult and sensitive question of whether marijuana should be available to relieve
severe pain and suffering." (internal citations omitted)).
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tem of government .... The States' core police powers have always
included authority to define criminal law and to protect the health,
safety, and welfare of their citizens.
237
From her perspective, the majority ended California's medical
marijuana experiment "without any proof that the personal cultivation,
possession, and use of marijuana for medicinal purposes, if economic
activity in the first place, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce
and is therefore an appropriate subject of federal regulation. 238 Justice
O'Connor determined that the majority should have applied the Lopez-
Morrison framework to avoid converting congressional Commerce
Clause authority into a general police power, which the framers denied
the federal government, but left to the states.
2 39
By failing to utilize the Lopez-Morrison framework, the majority
encouraged Congress to legislate broadly in derogation of state police
power and denied the respondents a true as-applied challenge.24 ° Justice
O'Connor would have narrowed the relevant inquiry to the distinct set of
circumstances presented by individuals like Raich and Monson - seri-
ously ill state citizens who personally grow and consume medical mari-
juana pursuant to state law.24 ' In other words, Justice O'Connor would
have approached this case along the same lines as the Ninth Circuit.
Within the context of this narrowed inquiry, Justice O'Connor
would have run through the now familiar litany of remaining Lopez-
Morrison factors, 242 determining that: (1) the activity at issue is non-
commercial; 24 3 (2) there is no jurisdictional element ensuring a connec-
tion to interstate commerce; 244 (3) the congressional findings posited in
the CSA are merely a series of declarations that "amount to nothing
more than a legislative insistence that the regulation of controlled sub-
stances must be absolute; ' 245 and (4) Congress's determination that all
marijuana will somehow seep into the interstate market is based on an
inference upon an inference. 46
Justice O'Connor would not allow Congress, without proof of a
substantial effect on interstate commerce, to frustrate a state's attempt to
provide its seriously ill citizens with doctor-recommended medical mari-
juana: "[S]imply because Congress may conclude a particular activity
237. Id. at 2220-21 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 2221 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
239. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2221 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
240. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
241. Id. 2224 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
242. Id. at 2221-22 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
243. Id. at 2225 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
244. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2225 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
245. Id. at 2227 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 2226-27 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it
so." 247 Presumably, Justice O'Connor would limit the following lan-
guage from Lopez to activities that are at least tangentially related to
commerce: "[A]n essential part of a larger regulation of economic activ-
ity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intra-
state activity were regulated. '248  Such a characterization would avoid
the majority's conclusion that medical marijuana use by seriously ill
California citizens undercuts the CSA, as these activities are admittedly
non-commercial.
In rebuttal of Justice Stevens' comprehensive Wickard analogy,
Justice O'Connor pointed out three important distinctions. First, she
acknowledged that Congress expressly limited the AAA's application to
wheat growing operations above a certain size. In contrast to Justice
Stevens, Justice O'Connor claimed Congress, in doing so, implicitly rec-
ognized the commerce power's limits and declined to overreach, thereby
avoiding impermissible congressional regulation at the level of the
"modest... home cook's herb garden.2 4 9 Second, she recognized that
in Wickard, the Court possessed voluminous congressional findings
demonstrating that supply gradations were the primary variable affecting
wheat-market stability; whereas in Raich, the Court lacked such compre-
hensive congressional findings regarding medical marijuana legislation's
effect on the illicit interstate marijuana market's supply and demand
levels .25
Third, and perhaps most important, Filburn was a commercial
farmer. Thus, all wheat growing activities occurring on his farm were at
least tangentially commercial in nature. In contrast, Raich and Monson
were not commercial marijuana producers at any level, tangential or oth-
251erwise. In other words, Raich and Monson were not part of the enter-
247. Id. at 2227 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. at 311 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment)).
248. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
249. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2225 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
250. Id. at 2227 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The Court recognizes that the record in the
Wickard case itself established the causal connection between the production for local use and the
national market and argues that we have before us findings by Congress to the same effect. The
Court refers to a series of declarations in the introduction to the CSA saying that (1) local
distribution and possession of controlled substances causes 'swelling' in interstate traffic; (2) local
production and distribution cannot be distinguished from interstate production and distribution; (3)
federal control over intrastate incidents 'is essential to effective control' over interstate drug
trafficking. These bare declarations cannot be compared to the record before the Court in
Wickard." (internal citations and quotations omitted)).
251. Id. at 2225 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Wickard involved a challenge to the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1938 (AAA), which directed the Secretary of Agriculture to set national quotas
on wheat production, and penalties for excess production. The AAA itself confirmed that
Congress made an explicit choice not to reach - and thus the Court could not possibly have
approved of federal control over - small-scale, noncommercial wheat farming. In contrast to the
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prise Congress sought to regulate via the CSA (i.e. illegal commercial
producers and distributors of marijuana). Rather, they were part of the
subclass of seriously ill state citizens for whom California sought to pro-
vide healthcare in the form of access to medical marijuana. 2
Finally, Justice O'Connor took issue with Justice Scalia's use of the
Necessary and Proper Clause as a means to justify congressional inter-
ference with California's police powers: "Congress cannot use its
authority under the Clause to contravene the principle of state sover-
eignty embodied in the Tenth Amendment." '253 If it were otherwise,
Congress could have recast the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, at
issue in Lopez, as a necessary and proper means of regulating the
national firearms market. 4
Justice O'Connor concluded that the Court faced a valid exercise of
state police power - provision of medical care - which the federal CSA
did not defeat because "[t]here is simply no evidence that homegrown
medicinal marijuana users constitute, in the aggregate, a sizable enough
class to have a discernable, let alone substantial, impact on the national
illicit drug market - or otherwise to threaten the CSA regime. More-
over, she understood that California had not legalized marijuana in toto,
but instead had created a separate class of legitimate medical marijuana
users, pursuant to its healthcare police power. "[The Court] generally
assume[s] States enforce their laws and [the Court] ha[s] no reason to
think otherwise here."
2 56
E. Justice Thomas' Dissent - The States are Co-equal
Sovereigns, Right?
For the most part, Justice Thomas echoed Justice O'Connor's con-
cern for preserving a certain level of inviolable state sovereignty:
The majority's rush to embrace federal power "is especially unfortu-
nate given the importance of showing respect for the sovereign States
that comprise our Federal Union." Our federalist system, properly
understood, allows California and a growing number of other States
to decide for themselves how to safeguard the health and welfare of
CSA's limitless assertion of power, Congress provided an exemption within the AAA for small
producers." (internal citations omitted)).
252. Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1228 (9th Cir. 2003) ("We find that the [respondents']
class of activities - the intrastate, noncommercial cultivation, possession and use of marijuana for
personal medical purposes on the advice of a physician - is, in fact, different in kind from drug
trafficking.").
253. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2226 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
254. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
255. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 2228 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of Blind of N.C., Inc.,
487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988)).
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their citizens.257
But his dissent is noteworthy for two issues that Justice O'Connor did
not address.
First, Justice Thomas reiterated his now familiar plea to abandon
the substantial effects test as a constitutional perversion. He instead
favors a return to an earlier conception of the commerce power, which
allowed Congress to reach activities of "trade or exchange - not all eco-
nomic or gainful activity that has some attenuated connection to trade or
exchange,'258 thus preventing congressional interference with the
"States' traditional police powers to define the criminal law and to pro-
tect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens. 259
The second distinct argument Justice Thomas offered was an adap-
tation of the proverbial drop-in-the-bucket metaphor. He applied this
metaphor to the government's claim that California's legalization of
medical marijuana will "substantially affect" interstate commerce.
Adeptly, Justice Thomas turned the government's assertions in his favor.
He accomplished this by first accepting the government's claim that
"there is a multibillion-dollar interstate market for marijuana' 26 and
then asking the logical corollary of how California's legalization of
medical marijuana can have a "substantial effect" on an already
burgeoning marijuana market. 261  Hence, the inquiry becomes - recog-
nizing that the illicit marijuana market was booming pre-medical mari-
juana legalization - what meaningful effect could such legalization
have? In a sense, the government's contention is comparable to one
claiming Bill Gates winning the lottery would "substantially affect" his
net worth.
Justice Thomas, however, recognized that this entire argument
should have been superfluous because the Court usually assumes that the
states will effectively enforce their own laws.26 2 In his mind, there was
257. Id. at 2238-39 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Oakland Cannabis
Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 502 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)).
258. Id. at 2230 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
259. Id. at 2234 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
260. Executive Office of the President, Office of Nat. Drug Control Policy, Marijuana Fact
Sheet 5 (Feb. 2004).
261. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2233 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("It is difficult to see how this vast
market could be affected by diverted medical cannabis, let alone in a way that makes regulating
intrastate medical marijuana obviously essential to controlling the interstate drug market.").
262. Id. at 2232 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("We normally presume that States enforce their own
laws, and there is no reason to depart from that presumption here: Nothing suggests that
California's controls are ineffective. The scant evidence that exists suggests that few people - the
vast majority of whom are aged 40 or older - register to use medical marijuana. In part because of
the low incidence of medical marijuana use, many law enforcement officials report that the
introduction of medical marijuana laws has not affected their law enforcement efforts." (internal
quotations and citations omitted)).
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no reason to assume that California's distinction between illegal mari-
juana use and legal medical marijuana use was any different.2 63 In short,
Justice Thomas reemphasized Justice O'Connor's concern with preserv-
ing a sphere of state sovereignty, while adding two important arguments
of his own: (1) the Court should reexamine the constitutional validity of
the substantial effects test;2 64 and (2) assuming the government is correct
about the size of the interstate marijuana market, there is no principled
argument that medical marijuana legalization will have any appreciable
effects.265
F. Raich's Consequences for Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
Justice Stevens' majority opinion encircles the Lopez-Morrison
framework in a cloud of uncertainty. Instead of steadfastly defending
the framework's underlying aspiration - to preserve a local sphere of
state sovereignty2 66 - Justice Stevens took the wind out of its sails by
distinguishing Lopez and Morrison on the facts.267 Chief Justice Rehn-
quist explicitly envisioned a larger role for the framework than simply
applying where Congress chose to legislate in the absence of a compre-
hensive regulatory scheme - the framework was to be the obligatory
approach in reviewing "substantial effects" Commerce Clause
legislation.268
The majority's reasoning validates Justices O'Connor and Thomas'
concern with giving Congress the perverse incentive to legislate broadly.
Congress may simply include the regulation of intrastate non-commer-
cial activity within a broad regulatory scheme that is generally commer-
cial in character, and the Court will honor such a decision by
proclaiming that the intrastate non-commercial aspects of the regulatory
scheme are "an essential part of a larger regulation of economic
activity."269
The most disconcerting aspect of the majority and concurring opin-
ions is their disregard for the fact that Raich involved a state exercising
its police powers. Even conceding Wickard's continuing validity, that
case involved the isolated activity of a commercial farmer, not a state
263. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
264. Id. at 2235 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
265. Id. at 2238 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
266. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995).
267. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2209.
268. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000) ("Since Lopez most recently
canvassed and clarified our case law governing this third category of Commerce Clause regulation
[i.e. activities that substantially affect interstate commerce], it provides the proper framework for
conducting the required analysis .... ").
269. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2217 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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exercising its retained police powers."' Raich, in contrast, involved a
state's decision to provide medical care to its seriously ill citizens by
allowing home-grown medical marijuana upon a state-licensed physi-
cian's recommendation.271 If the Court wishes to recognize a sphere of
state sovereignty, where a state acts pursuant to a traditional police
power, the Court must enunciate a more sustainable doctrine to protect
that sovereignty from federal encroachment. Otherwise, Justice Bran-
deis' oft reiterated notion that "a single courageous State may, if its citi-
zens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country," '272 will be
remembered as a mere utopian pipe dream.
IV. CRITIQUE
A. Justice Stevens' Disconnect from the Lopez-Morrison Framework
- Should Wickard & Wirtz Apply in Raich?
As intimated in the preceding sections, Justice Stevens was content
to distinguish, rather than apply the Lopez-Morrison framework. How-
ever, the precedential value of those two cases would seem to dictate
their application rather than distinction. As Chief Justice Rehnquist
stated in Morrison, "[s]ince Lopez most recently canvassed and clarified
our case law governing this third category of Commerce Clause regula-
tion [i.e. activities that substantially affect interstate commerce], it pro-
vides the proper framework for conducting the required analysis.
2 z7 3
Lopez and Morrison were not intended as cases readily distinguishable
via slight factual deviations.274 Admittedly, Lopez and Morrison were
not easy to apply because Justice Rehnquist declined to overrule seem-
ingly conflicting Third Era precedent.275 They were, nevertheless,
intended to provide an ongoing analytical framework regarding "sub-
stantial effects" legislation, regardless of whether the pertinent challenge
was facial or as-applied.276
Consequently, Justice Stevens' decision to distinguish Lopez and
Morrison based on the fact that Raich and Monson brought as-applied,
as opposed to facial challenges, is questionable.277 Justice Stevens'
270. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
271. Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1228 (9th Cir. 2003).
272. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
273. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000).
274. Id.
275. See, e.g., McCloskey, supra note 6, at 195-96.
276. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609.
277. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2209 (2005) ("Here, respondents ask us to excise
individual applications of a concededly valid statutory scheme. In contrast, in both Lopez and
Morrison, the parties asserted that a particular statute or provision fell outside Congress'
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proffered defense was that the Court lacked the authority to "excise indi-
vidual applications of a concededly valid statutory scheme. 278 Justice
Thomas, however, rebutted that very argument quite effectively in his
dissent:
But [Justice Stevens' argument] begs the question at issue: whether
respondents' "class of activities" is "within the reach of federal
power," which depends in turn on whether the class is defined at a
low or a high level of generality. If medical marijuana patients like
Monson and Raich largely stand outside the interstate drug market,
then courts must excise them from the CSA's coverage.2 79
The source of Justice Stevens' argument that the Court lacks the author-
ity to "excise individual applications of a concededly valid statutory
scheme," casts further doubt on its applicability to Raich. That language
emerged from Wirtz, which we know involved Enterprise Theory. 8 °
Therefore, such an argument is inapposite where the individuals sought
to be regulated are not involved in an enterprise that at some level is
engaged in interstate commerce .21 Raich and Monson did not grow
their medical marijuana as part of any commercial enterprise; thus, Ste-
vens' reliance on Wirtz's enterprise theory is inappropriate. What the
Court actually faced in Raich was not a commercial enterprise of any
sort, but rather two very sick women whose doctors recommended medi-
cal marijuana, pursuant to state law, after conventional medicine failed
them.
Justice Stevens' heavy reliance on Wickard is equally questionable.
Chief Justice Rehnquist stated in Lopez that "[iun every case where we
have sustained federal regulation under the aggregation principle in
Wickard ... the regulated activity was of an apparent commercial char-
acter."'282 Despite Justice Stevens' protestations to the contrary, the fact
that Filburn was a commercial farmer undoubtedly played a role in the
Wickard decision. Were that not the case, Congress could reach "some-
thing as modest as the home cook's herb garden. 283 What is more,
Justice Rehnquist would never have made the claim that every Com-
merce Clause case involving an application of the Aggregation Principle
commerce power in its entirety. This distinction is pivotal for we have often reiterated that
[w]here the class of activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of federal power, the
courts have no power to excise, as trivial, individual instances of the class." (internal citations and
quotations omitted)).
278. Id.
279. Id. at 2237 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
280. Maryland v Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 188 (1968).
281. See Kreit, supra note 117.
282. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 n.4 (2000) (emphasis supplied).
283. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2225 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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"was of an apparent commercial character, '284 if Filburn's status as a
commercial wheat farmer was irrelevant. Thus, the Ninth Circuit's rea-
soning below is more appropriate: "As the regulated activity in this case
is not commercial, Wickard's aggregation analysis is not applicable.
'285
Simply because Congress stated in the CSA that "[c]ontrolled sub-
stances manufactured and distributed intrastate cannot be differentiated
from controlled substances manufactured and distributed interstate" does
not make it so: "Whether particular operations affect interstate com-
merce sufficiently to come under the constitutional power of Congress to
regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative ques-
tion. '286 Furthermore, such a claim does not magically render Wick-
ard's Aggregation Principle applicable to non-commercial activities, in
light of Justice Rehnquist's aforementioned language from Lopez.2 87 A
critical observation which should have played a larger role in Justice
Stevens' majority opinion was the fact that the California CUA did not
legalize marijuana use; rather, it legalized medical marijuana use:
[W]here that medical use is deemed appropriate and has been recom-
mended by a physician who has determined that the person's health
would benefit from the use of marijuana in the treatment of cancer,
anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis,
migraine, or any other illness for which marijuana provides relief.288
And despite Justice Scalia's assertion that the federal government is not
forced to rely on the states' effective enforcement of their laws, the
Court "normally presume[s] that States enforce their own laws. 2 89 Cor-
respondingly, federal encroachment is highly suspect where "Congress
has encroached on States' traditional police powers to define the crimi-
nal law and to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens. '290
All told, the Raich dissenters and the Ninth Circuit majority
adhered to Court precedent by distinguishing Wickard and Wirtz and
applying the Lopez-Morrison framework. It is doubtful the Court origi-
nally intended for Wirtz's Enterprise Theory to apply in contexts other
than cases involving the regulation of the non-interstate activities of
commercial enterprises that at some level participate in interstate com-
merce. 29' Since Raich and Monson did not participate in any commer-
284. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611 n.4.
285. Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1230 (9th Cir. 2003).
286. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 n.2 (1995); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614.
287. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 611 n.4.
288. Compassionate Use Act of 1996, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2004).
289. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2232 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Riley v.
Nat'l Fed'n of Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988)).
290. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2234 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.
619, 635 (1993); Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985)).
291. See Kreit, supra note 117.
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cial enterprise, Justice Stevens' Enterprise Theory analysis was
inappropriate.
Also, as Chief Justice Rehnquist stated in Lopez, Aggregation Prin-
ciple cases involve "regulated activity . . . of an apparent commercial
character. '29 2 Raich and Monson, regardless of the existence of a com-
mercial market for marijuana, did not partake in such a market. Rather,
they cultivated medical marijuana - pursuant to California law - for
wholly personal consumption as recommended by a state-licensed physi-
cian. Their cultivation and consumption was as non-commercial "as the
home cook's herb garden. '29 3 Given these observations, one is left with
Justice O'Connor's Lopez-Morrison analysis: (1) the activity at issue is
non-commercial;294 (2) there is no jurisdictional element ensuring a con-
nection to interstate commerce;2 95 (3) the congressional findings posited
in the CSA are merely a series of declarations that "amount to nothing
more than a legislative insistence that the regulation of controlled sub-
stances must be absolute; '2 96 and (4) Congress's determination that all
marijuana will somehow seep into the interstate market is based on an
inference upon an inference.297
Given the reality, however, that Justice Stevens' majority opinion is
now the law, the resulting conception of the Lopez-Morrison framework
is just as Justice O'Connor feared - it is "little more than a drafting
guide. '298 The reality is that Congress may, in the words of Justice
Thomas, "draw the circle broadly enough to cover an activity that, when
taken in isolation, would not have substantial effects on commerce.'"299
Henceforth, the Court will apparently defer to congressional inclusion of
wholly local, non-commercial activities in a broad regulatory scheme
that generally targets commercial activity, so long as Congress asserts
that the intrastate non-commercial aspects of the regulatory scheme are
"an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which
the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity
were regulated. 3 °°
Such a characterization does absolutely nothing to preserve a
sphere of local state sovereignty." 1 In reality, as Justice O'Connor
292. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 n.4 (2000).
293. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2225 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
294. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
295. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
296. Id. at 2227 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
297. Id. at 2226-27 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
298. Id. at 2223 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
299. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 600 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); Raich, 125 S.
Ct. at 2238 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
300. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2209-10 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).
301. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557.
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noted, such a characterization has just the opposite effect by giving Con-
gress the incentive to legislate broadly in derogation of state police
power.30 2 This allows Congress to co-opt, rather than recognize, tradi-
tional areas of state sovereignty, and contributes to the creation of a
completely centralized government.3 °3 Additionally, when coupled with
Justice Scalia's assertion that when exercising such a broad commerce
power the federal government is not forced to rely on the states to
enforce their own laws, the Court is practically begging Congress to use
the Commerce Clause as the "hey, you-can-do-whatever-you-feel-like
Clause. 3 °4
The Raich majority made it abundantly clear that supporters of the
notion that the Tenth Amendment imposes limits on Congress's ability
to regulate the states via the Commerce Clause will have to utilize a
doctrinal tool other than the Lopez-Morrison Framework to preserve a
"distinction between what is national and what is local. 30 5
B. Post-Raich, What Recourse Do the States Have?
The Court, through Raich, has foreclosed the possibility that state
medical marijuana legalization statutes provide protection from federal
prosecution. 30 6 Are there any routes left for states like California that
see a legitimate need for medical marijuana? Certainly, there is the
route offered by Justice Stevens307 and Professor Wechsler30 8 - lobby
Congress and push citizens to vote for candidates who support
rescheduling marijuana. But, given the current national political cli-
mate, the efficacy of such efforts remains doubtful.
Another prospective route is to create a completely state owned and
operated program controlling medical marijuana dispensation from farm
to patient. It would be virtually impossible for the federal government
to argue that such a program had a substantial, non-inferential impact on
interstate commerce. For example, California could conceivably - fund-
ing issues aside - create a state governmental body to grow medical
302. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2221 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
303. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
304. Alex Kozinski, Introduction to Volume Nineteen, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'v 1, 5
(1995).
305. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2216 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566-67).
306. Id. at 2215.
307. Id. ("We do note, however, the presence of another avenue of relief. As the Solicitor
General confirmed during oral argument, the statute authorizes procedures for the reclassification
of Schedule I drugs. But perhaps even more important than these legal avenues is the democratic
process, in which the voices of voters allied with these respondents may one day be heard in the
halls of Congress. Under the present state of the law, however, the judgment of the Court of
Appeals must be vacated.").
308. See Wechsler, supra note 11.
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marijuana, harvest the medical marijuana, and distribute the medical
marijuana at state run dispensaries to California citizens with valid doc-
tor recommendations.
To further allay federal concerns about diversion into the illicit
marijuana market, states could require such patients to consume their
medical marijuana on-site, in the presence of medical personnel. If the
federal government sought to regulate that type of tightly controlled
state program, whaL actually lies at the bottom of this entire dilemma
would emerge - the federal government abhors marijuana use in any
context, even by extremely sick individuals. What remains clear is
"[t]he States' core police powers have always included authority to
define criminal law and to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their
citizens."3 °9 If Justices Brandeis and O'Connor are correct that "a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country,"310 states like California, if they can allot the requisite funding,
should be able to create such programs.
Simply put, a state run, non-profit, tightly controlled medical mari-
juana dispensation program could not be readily characterized as com-
mercial or economic. Furthermore, restricting patients to on-site
consumption in the presence of medical staff would allay concerns about
diversion into the illicit marijuana market. Of course, other enumerated
powers would remain to frustrate the states, for example Congress's tax-
ing and spending power. 31 ' However, congressional frustration of an
imaginative state's efforts to create such a program, after the state care-
fully avoided commerce implications, would be extraordinarily
draconian.
The ultimate question becomes whether it is wise to allow Con-
gress, in spite of the states' traditional power to "protect the health,
safety, and welfare of their citizens, 312 to monopolize the authority to
decide whether marijuana has a legitimate medical purpose. If one
believes the states are residual sovereigns retaining historic spheres of
state sovereignty protected from excessive federal encroachment, free to
act as legislative laboratories, it seems states should have some recourse
to provide their seriously ill citizenry with medical marijuana.: 3 State
discontent with federal marijuana policies is currently making headlines,
309. See Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2234 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
310. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
311. See generally South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
312. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2234 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.
619, 635 (1993); Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985)).
313. New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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but none offers the hope of immunity from federal prosecution. 314 How
states answer the problems Raich poses will be interesting to say the
least.
C. Following Raich, What Direction Should the Court Take to
Preserve State Sovereignty?
The post-Rehnquist Supreme Court faces a broader issue - should
the Court embrace a limited or broad conception of federalism? If the
Court chooses the latter, new doctrinal tools are necessary to preserve a
local sphere for state police power regulation.3"5 If history offers any
guidance in this situation, it is that the Tenth Amendment is a resilient
bit of constitutional language.316 What remain uncertain are the charac-
teristics we should expect from a resurgent Tenth Amendment.
Raich's overarching message appears to be that the Supreme Court
is willing to distinguish Lopez and Morrison on the facts, rather than
adhering to Chief Justice Rehnquist's intent that the Lopez-Morrison
framework provide the required analysis for addressing substantial
effects issues.317 Justice Souter's premonition that Lopez represented a
mere doctrinal misstep may have finally come to pass.31 8 This realiza-
tion is especially disconcerting for proponents of a less centralized
government.
The Raich majority severely constrained the Lopez-Morrison
framework, subverting the framework's stated purpose of ensuring a
"distinction between what is national and what is local," to avoid the
creation of "a completely centralized government." '319 As Justices
O'Connor and Thomas pointed out, the majority and concurrence's
stance creates a perverse incentive for the federal government to legis-
314. See Katie Zezima, Rhode Island: New Marijuana Law, NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 4, 2006, at
A 11, available at 2006 WLNR 127512; http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/04/national/04brfs.html
("Rhode Island has become the first state to enact a law sanctioning the use of medical marijuana
since the Supreme Court ruled in [Gonzales v. Raich] that the authorities could prosecute users,
even in states with laws that allow its use. The State House of Representatives overrode the veto
of Gov. Donald L. Carcieri, a Republican who rejected the measure last year, 59 to 13. Rhode
Island is the 11 th state to allow the use of marijuana for medical purposes.").
315. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995).
316. Compare Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 580 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("I do not think it incumbent on those of us in dissent to spell out
further the fine points of a principle that will, I am confident, in time again command the support
of a majority of this Court."), with Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 ("Under the theories that the
Government presents in support of § 922(q), it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal
power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where States historically have
been sovereign. Thus, if we were to accept the Government's arguments, we are hard pressed to
posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate.").
317. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2209 (2005).
318. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 614-15 (Souter, J., dissenting).
319. Id. at 557.
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late broadly, in derogation of the states' retained police powers.32 °
Thus, the Court has invited Congress to employ the Commerce Clause
to regulate intrastate non-commercial activities by characterizing these
activities as "an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity,
in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate
activity were regulated."'32' By accepting such a limited view of federal-
ism, the Court has gone a long way towards redefining the Commerce
Clause as the "hey, you-can-do-whatever-you-feel-likc Clause. 322
It remains to be seen whether the Court will stray from the Morri-
son-Lopez framework in non-drug contexts, but to do otherwise would
be highly inconsistent and would yield credibility to the notion that the
Court makes ad hoc decisions when drug regulation is involved. If the
future members of the Court adopt a broader vision of federalism, some
enterprising Justice must articulate a doctrine that cannot be conve-
niently distinguished based on the facts.
Perhaps the necessary step is to reinstate and revitalize an aban-
doned Rehnquist doctrine - the National League of Cities dichotomy. In
Seventh Amendment right-to-jury-trial situations, the Court is willing to
analogize present-day causes of action to 18th century causes of action
to determine if they are legal or equitable.3 23 If such an analogy is pos-
sible, creating a distinction between traditional and non-traditional gov-
ernment functions is hardly "unworkable." '324 We can identify the broad
regulatory areas where the states' traditional police powers applied: they
"have always included authority to define criminal law and to protect the
health, safety, and welfare of their citizens." '325 Therefore, the Court
could categorize state regulations based on whether they fit the defini-
tion of a traditional state police power. In short, the Court could define
the states' traditional government functions based on the states' historic
police powers.
Where Congress claims to legislate within the "substantial effects"
context, in derogation of one of these traditional state police powers, the
320. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2221 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
321. Id. at 2209-10 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)).
322. Kozinski, supra note 304.
323. Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 569-70 (1990) (holding that the right to
a jury trial turns on whether the relevant cause of action and remedy are analogous to those from
the 18th century common law which permitted jury trials).
324. Cf. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985) ("[T]he attempt
to draw the boundaries of state regulatory immunity in terms of 'traditional governmental
function' is not only unworkable but is also inconsistent with established principles of federalism
and, indeed, with those very federalism principles on which National League of Cities purported
to rest. That case, accordingly, is overruled." (emphasis supplied)).
325. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2221 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson,
507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603 n. 30 (1977)).
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Court ought to require a higher level of scrutiny. The Court should, as
Justice Thomas suggested, begin with the presumption that a state effec-
tively enforces its own laws.32 6 To accord federalism concerns due
weight, the Court should require concrete congressional findings, dem-
onstrating that a commerce regulation's subject matter does in fact have
a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce. Reviewing federal com-
merce legislation in this manner would account for a key distinction
between Wickard and Raich - Raich involved a state regulating pursuant
to a traditional police power (i.e. healthcare), whereas Wickard did
not.
327
If states are truly residual sovereigns, congressional self-restraint
should not shape the contours of state sovereignty on an impromptu
basis. Instead, per its constitutional duty, the Court should impose some
affirmative restraints on congressional power as it relates to retained
state sovereignty. This proposed form of "substantial effects" review
would impose those restraints by borrowing a portion of the
Lopez-Morrison framework - congressional findings demonstrating a
"substantial effect" on interstate commerce.328 But, rather than serving
an informative role, as they did in the Lopez-Morrison Framework,
these findings would be required where a traditional state police power
is at stake.
V. CONCLUSION
Raich leaves us at a commerce crossroads; which path the Roberts
Court will choose is uncertain. What remains probable, though, is that
the Tenth Amendment will eventually reemerge as a limit on Congress's
commerce power. The precise nature of such a reemergence remains
indiscernible, but heightened judicial scrutiny would go a long way
towards restoring balance to our system of federalism.
326. Id. at 2232 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
327. See id. at 2221 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
328. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 612 (2000).
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